


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TENNESSEE

HISTORICAL MAGAZINE

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THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN

THE KEY TO THE LAST CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST.

[Spring Hill, Franklin and Nashville in November and December 1864 have furnished the occasion for much discussion, written and printed documents. Civil War students will be interested in another discussion which we are pleased to present in the Tennessee Historical Magazine. The author Rev. W. W. Gist, D. D. was born in southern Ohio, enlisted in the 26th Ohio in 1864 at the age of fifteen. Served in the Atlanta campaign until the fall of that city. Then under Thomas at Franklin and Nashville in Wagner's brigade. Went to the border of Mexico with the Fourth Corps under Gen. Sheridan. Returning from the war he entered school preparatory to college, graduated at Ohio State University in 1872, attended Union Seminary, New York, and in 1881 was ordained to the ministry by the Cleveland Presbytery. Has served a number of years in the pastorate and has held professorships at Coe College and Iowa Teacher's College. For twenty-one years he has filled the chair of English in the latter institution. Is the author of several textbooks, a contributor to numerous magazines—among them the Confederate Veteran. In 1921 was unanimously chosen Chaplain-in-Chief of the Grand Army of the Republic at Columbus, Ohio.

Dr. Gist writes:—"During the World War I wore four stars in memory of my sons in the army, one is still a Captain in the service. My father came from Maryland and General States Rights Gist was a distant relative of mine. We fought at Franklin nearly opposite each other. I trust it was not one of my bullets that struck him."—Ed.]

The importance of the western campaign in which Hood's army was completely overthrown has not been fully recognized. Few have appreciated the influence of that great victory in hastening the end of the war. It freed the Mississippi Valley from a hostile foe, but it did far more than this. It made it possible for General Sherman to march victoriously through the Southland and it justified his bold undertaking.

In a campaign that lasted only about two months there were three points of contact that deserve attention. At Spring Hill the Federal army was in the greatest danger and would have been overwhelmed had it not been for the skill with

which General Stanley handled his single division. The full fruits of the campaign were gathered at Nashville and not a few give undue prominence to that battle. At Franklin the slaughter of the Confederates was something awful and the loss includes thirteen generals. This great loss weakened the fighting ability of Hood's army and what is more important it did much to destroy the morale with which it had entered Tennessee looking for an easy victory. The one who would get the real key to the entire campaign must understand the battle of Franklin. It is unfortunate that two generals on the Federal side who blundered at Franklin have had a wide hearing in the books they have published. In attempting to throw the blame upon others they have beclouded certain facts. The testimony of a man in the ranks is often as important as that of a man with stars on his shoulders.

THE SITUATION IN 1864

In the spring of 1864 Grant was made lieutenant general and from that time all our armies were directed by one master mind. While there were hostile forces confronting each other in various parts of the South, the eyes of the country were fixed on two great movements, the one under Grant and the other under Sherman. Grant gave his personal attention to the forces facing Lee in Virginia. Sherman, the commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, started south with Atlanta as the goal.

He had under him three armies: the Army of the Ohio, the Twenty-Third corps, under General Schofield; the Army of the Cumberland; the Fourth corps, the Fourteenth corps, and the Twentieth corps, under General George H. Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee under General James B. McPherson. At that time not a few in the Middle West felt that Thomas had actually won more distinction than Sherman and should have been given the command, but Sherman proved himself equal to the task. The correspondence of Sherman shows that he relied on Thomas more than any other man. The campaign lasted four months and Atlanta fell on the third of September.

Soon Hood, the daring and dashing commander of the Confederate forces, succeeded in throwing his army into the rear of Sherman's army and this caused Sherman to rush a part of his forces north over the ground that he had won a few weeks before. People of the North became solicitous and felt that the fruits of the campaign had been largely lost, but Hood finally had to withdraw to Alabama to prepare for an

other expedition. Then Sherman completed his plans for marching through to the sea. Of course, there was the problem of meeting Hood and weakening his power.

SHERMAN DIVIDES HIS ARMY.

Sherman decided to take the five corps with him and leave two corps under Thomas to meet the same army that the seven corps had fought all summer. Some who went through the campaign have been confused in regard to the Sixteenth corps. The Army of the Tennessee had in those months three corps, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth, and the Seventeenth. The Sixteenth had been commanded by General Dodge. He was wounded near Atlanta. Then Sherman placed one division of the corps into the Fifteenth corps and the other into the Seventeenth corps, making the two wings of his army about equal. The five corps followed him through the South, but under four organizations. The Fourth corps and the Twenty-Third corps left behind felt that the task before them was a big one and it proved to be. Of course, there were garrisons that could be joined with Thomas' army and General A. J. Smith in Missouri had been ordered to bring three divisions of the Sixteenth corps to Tennessee.

After taking Atlanta a part of Sherman's army had a short rest. This is hardly true of the Second Division of the Fourth corps to which the writer's regiment belonged. We were sent back to Chattanooga to ward off the Confederate cavalry which kept threatening important places. We were sent by rail toward Knoxville and toward Stevenson and later up the Lookout Valley several times. At last we were sent by rail to Athens, Alabama, and thence we marched to Pulaski, Tennessee, near the southern border of the state. We began to build forts, but we knew nothing of Hood's movements. Here we were joined by the other divisions of the Fourth corps. The cavalry was on the lookout and were really the eyes of the army. On the twenty-second of November we began to move northward toward Columbia where a part of the Twenty-third corps joined us. General Smith's corps did not join us till we reached Nashville. At Columbia we built works as was our custom, but on the 28th we crossed to the north side of Duck River.

SITUATION IN GENERAL.

The military situation in general was as follows: General Thomas was at Nashville concentrating his resources to meet Hood. He had much to do. Many of the cavalrymen had been dismounted to equip Sherman's army with horses.

It required a month for Smith to bring his troops from Missouri. General Stanley was commander of the Fourth corps which numbered about 15,000 men. General Schofield commanded the Twenty-third corps and this numbered about 10,000 men. Stanley outranked Schofield in date of commission, but Schofield was a department commander and the War Department decided he must take the precedence of Stanley. There seems to have been no friction between these corps commanders. While Schofield was performing the duties of the larger command, Cox had command of the Twenty-third corps.

In addition to the infantry there was a cavalry corps under General J. H. Wilson which numbered about 4,500. The cavalry numbered many more on paper, but they were in detachments scattered far and wide and many were without horses. General Wilson had been serving in the eastern army, but was sent by General Grant to take charge of Sherman's cavalry. He was then but twenty-seven years of age, but had won the confidence of his superiors to an unusual degree. After a long conference with Sherman it was decided that Kilpatrick should command the horsemen to follow Sherman and Wilson should remain and help Thomas. Wilson began his work of organizing a cavalry corps with headquarters at Nashville under the eye of Thomas, but as soon as Hood entered Tennessee he hastened to the front to take personal command of his men, meeting Schofield near Pulaski. Wilson proved to be the very man for the place. He made known the movements of the enemy and fought a superior force whenever the occasion required it.

AT COLUMBIA

Hood formed his men in line at Columbia and once more we were face to face with our old foe. Here our artillery opened briskly on the enemy across the river. It was plain that he did not intend to make a direct attack. Wilson discovered that the Confederates were crossing the river above Columbia and he sent word to Schofield and even suggested that he withdraw to Spring Hill twelve miles north. The situation was so critical that some of our cavalry watching the fords up the river were cut off from the main body of our forces. Major Young of the Fifth Iowa collected these detachments and cut his way through the enemy's line. Hood's plan, given in his own account later, was to leave a small force at Columbia to attract Schofield's attention while he with seven divisions of his infantry and all his cavalry should make a forced march

northward and cut off the Federal army. He came near accomplishing that very thing.

Here Schofield made his first blunder. Instead of following Wilson's suggestion about withdrawing his troops, on the morning of November 29 he started the First and Second Divisions of the Fourth corps toward Spring Hill, twelve miles to the north. With these divisions started also the wagon train of the whole army including the rations, ammunition wagons, ambulances, and seven batteries of artillery, the vehicles numbering from eight hundred to a thousand. In a short time the First Division was halted to guard a crossing. The Second Division, formerly Sheridan's, was now commanded by General G. D. Wagner. As corps commander Stanley saw fit to go with this advance guard as it was likely to meet great responsibilities. In the hurried march a line of "flankers" was kept on our right to guard against any sudden attack. A few miles east Hood's army was marching nearly parallel to us consisting of Cheatham's and Stewart's corps. A mile or so before the line reached Spring Hill my regiment, the Twenty-sixth Ohio, was halted to guard a crossing. My company, however, was marching as "flankers" and was not halted, forming a part of the skirmish line after the town was reached. The regiment was so depleted that fewer than a hundred men were left to guard the road.

SPRING HILL.

The head of the column reached Spring Hill soon after noon and found Forrest's cavalry just entering. The three brigades were formed in a semi-circle on the east side of the town to protect the wagon train. The train could not move on toward Franklin as the Confederate cavalry was waiting for the opportunity to destroy it. Hardly had the cavalry been driven out when the infantry of Cheatham and Stewart began to appear and press our line back. Without going into details of the struggle it may be said that the army was not in such a critical position again in the campaign. Stanley and Wagner showed remarkable skill in handling their force. The brigade commanders often had to take the initiative in sending a regiment to a point where the line seemed about to be broken. Even regimental commanders had to send companies in different directions as they saw the need. Our artillery of seven batteries had been placed on knolls and did splendid work in sending shells right into the ranks of the advancing foe. Stanley had fewer than six thousand men. A Confederate authority, Judge J. P. Young, says that Hood had 25,021 on the field in striking distance.

Why then did not Hood crush that small force and destroy the wagon train? That is a question that our Confederate friends have discussed for fifty-five years and various conclusions have been reached. The failure caused a great deal of crimination and recrimination. The seven batteries so wisely stationed did such effective work that our foes imagined that we had a larger force than we had. Some of our men who were captured were asked whether the whole of the Fourth corps was there and they answered yes. They honestly thought so. One division of the Twenty-third corps was eight miles away and that was not near enough to render assistance. The rest of Schofield's force was at Columbia or near that place. Hood did order Cheatham, Cleburne, and other subordinate commanders to push the attack, when he saw our men and the wagons moving on the pike, but the attacks were feeble and did not accomplish anything. A simple incident mentioned by a captain in a Tennessee regiment shows how the Confederates in the rank felt about the delay. A private said to another, as he saw our troops moving along the pike: "Why are we not fighting?"

Another replied, "Because there is no hill for the generals to get behind." General Cheatham heard the droll answer and smiled.

Night came on early on that short November day and the order to attack vigorously was not carried out. Hood renewed his order near midnight when he heard that our troops were moving on the pike, but this met with no response. Hood naturally blamed Cheatham for the failure and at first asked for his removal. Cox thinks that Hood must bear the blame, since as commander he had the means of enforcing his orders by direct commands to subordinates. Cox failed in the same way the next day, but never desired the rule applied to his conduct.

After dark Wagner's division remained in line east of Spring Hill close to the village. We had not eaten anything since early in the morning and we were not allowed to build a fire or speak above a whisper. Indeed, we got nothing to eat the next day either. We could plainly see the Confederates walking about their campfires perhaps a half mile away, but they seemed nearer. Soon after dark the Twenty-third corps reached Spring Hill with its advance guard and began to cheer, thinking they were soon to go into camp. Word was passed back that the fires were Hood's and all must remain silent. The rest of the Fourth corps came in the rear and all moved on toward Franklin. In our advanced line the situation seemed

precarious indeed. Our orderly sergeant had been shot through the body and left in a hut out in front, after his watch had been secured. We could not help thinking of him lying there dying, or perhaps, dead. Near daybreak our division, without the sound of bugle or drum or rattle of musket, moved back to the Franklin pike and formed the rear guard in the retreat.

THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 30TH.

The next morning when Hood learned that the Federal army and train had passed in safety, he was furious and blamed his officers severely. The officers seemed to have felt the reprimand keenly and determined that there should be no lack of initiative in the next conflict. This accounts in part for the furious fighting that evening.

On the way to Franklin General Brown remarked to a staff officer:

"General Hood is mad about the enemy getting away last night and is to charge the blame on somebody. He is as wrathful as a rattlesnake this morning, striking at everything."

General Brown then related what Hood had said to him personally:

"General Brown, in the movement to-day I wish you to bear in mind this military principle: that when a pursuing army comes up with the retreating enemy he must be immediately attacked. If you have a brigade in front as advance guard, order its commander to attack as soon as he comes up with him. If you have a regiment in advance and it comes up with the enemy, give the colonel orders to attack him if there is but a company in advance and it overtakes the entire Yankee army, order the captain to attack it forthwith; and if anything blocks the road in front of you today, don't stop a minute, but turn out into the fields or woods and move on to the front."

Hood seems to have infused this spirit into his officers that morning. That accounts for the reckless fighting before the day was over and the awful slaughter that took place.

It fell to Wagners' division to act as rear guard inasmuch as we had the advance the previous day, Opdycke's brigade bringing up the actual rear. Though we had had nothing to eat since the previous morning, we were glad to resume the retreat without further fighting. Our brigade saw none of the enemy. In one part of the line the Confederate cavalry made a dash to capture a battery. The gunners promptly took position for action and kept the enemy off and soon the infantry came to the rescue. The extreme rear guard did a good deal of skirmishing. New men had come to a few of the commands and these had hard work to keep up in the forced march. Many of them were ready to drop out and give up. Officers

made them throw away their knapsacks and thus lighten their burdens. Very few of them were probably captured, but they doubtless slept without blankets the first days of December. Our division came within two or three miles of Franklin at about eleven o'clock and at once formed a line of battle. Almost immediately the Confederate cavalry appeared in the distance and filed to the west on a side road. A battery threw some shells in that direction. Some of the men built fires hastily and tried to make coffee, but we had to move so often that no refreshments could be prepared.

FRANKLIN BATTLE GROUND.

To understand the situation clearly we should turn our attention to Franklin. The town is situated on the Harpeth River which forms almost a semicircle on the north. General Schofield had arrived at the town at the head of his command just before daylight. The two divisions of the Twenty-third corps and the other two divisions of the Fourth corps had marched all night from Columbia, a distance of almost twenty-five miles. The column kept coming in for some hours. The men of course were very tired. They were allowed to prepare their breakfast. Then they were set to building fortifications on the south side of the town. This was following the ordinary custom of the army when the enemy was anywhere near.

Schofield gave his attention to refitting the bridges for the army to cross. There is abundant evidence that the leading generals had no serious thought that Hood would make an assault across that open field. It was thought that Forrest would cross the river either above or below the town and by threatening the rear of Schofield's army compel a retreat. Wood's division of the Fourth corps crossed the north bank of the river which would be the point of greatest danger in case Forrest forced a crossing. It appears that Stanley was evidently to give his attention to this force as he had to Wagner's division the previous day. Cox was only a brigadier general, but he was given command of the Twenty-Third corps after Schofield assumed the larger command. The artillery of the Twenty-Third corps crossed to the river as did a large part of the ammunition train. It fell to the lot of Cox to arrange the battle line in case Hood should make an attack. He placed one division of the Twenty-Third corps (Reilly's) east of the Columbia Pike and the other (Ruger's) west of the pike. This force was not sufficient to cover the entire front and Kimball's division of the Fourth corps was assigned to the extreme right, his command reaching the river

on the west. The Fourth corps artillery was ordered to report to Cox for places in the line. Cox was in command of the entire battle line and so Wagner was also under his orders. Cox showed skill in directing the building of the works. The men labored faithfully and made as good a line of fortifications as the means at hand permitted. All this was done to be ready in case an attack should be made.

SURPRISED AT THE ATTACK.

As evidence that an assault was hardly expected Wagner received written orders at 11:30 that morning to keep his command on the heights, unless too hard pressed and then cross to the north bank after dark. This order did not assume that a fight would take place in front of the town. General Stanley says in his report:

From 1 o'clock until 4 in the evening the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack, yet in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield's headquarters until the firing commenced." Later Cox wrote: "It seemed most probable that Hood would use the same strategy as at Columbia and force us to make a farther retreat by crossing the Harpeth either above us or below us."

The advancing of Hood's army in battle array was not sufficient to convince Cox that an attack was about to be made. In a few pages farther on he adds:

"It was evident that Hood was deploying, but it might be only for the purpose of encamping in line of battle just beyond the range of projectiles, as he had done at Columbia before beginning his flanking movement."

These words of the commander of the battle line seem to express just what the other higher generals felt. They did not seem to grasp the situation as well as did men in the ranks.

Having noticed the location of the different commands about Franklin, let us now follow the movements of Wagner's division out in the advanced line. It is fitting to add that the writer does not give the location of these divisions in the battle line from actual knowledge at the time. He did not learn these until years afterwards. Opdycke's brigade as the actual rear guard had had a very hard march for the half day, fighting off the Confederate cavalry and spurring on the laggards who were so weary that they were inclined to drop to the ground and give up the struggle. This commander—he was only a colonel—objected to keeping his weary brigade out in front. Wagner gave him permission to withdraw inside the

works and form a reserve perhaps a hundred yards back of the line. This movement gave him the opportunity to win special distinction before the sun went down. The two remaining brigades were commanded by Colonel Lane and Colonel Conrad. The generals were few and the men in the ranks seemed to sense the real situation better than those in high command. Our two brigades made various movements out in that open plain and at last our battle line was formed about one-third of a mile in front of the works, Conrad's brigade east of the Columbia pike and Lane's on the west. My regiment was on the extreme right of Lane's brigade and this part of the line was refused to some extent. So we were somewhat nearer the works than the rest of the command. Our small brigades numbered fewer than 3,500 men and was a very small force to meet an army.

AN IMPOSING SIGHT.

About one o'clock the Confederate line appeared over the hill from which we had advanced, known as Winstead Hill. It is about two miles from Franklin. The ground between the town and hill is comparatively level, though there are undulations here and there. There are clumps of trees that shut off the view in places, but no real forests. The Confederates kept advancing, but would stop and correct their lines at intervals. One from a distance might easily imagine them out for drill or inspection or preparing for a grand review. It was an imposing sight and had in it the element of grandeur, the grandeur of the approaching cyclone. Thus for three hours they were in full view.

The accounts given by the Confederates indicate plainly that the attacking army felt that the conflict would be something terrible. Colonel Ellison Capers of the Twenty-fourth South Carolina infantry belonging to Gist's brigade gives a graphic account of the situation before the actual charge began. He says in his report:

"Just before the charge was ordered the brigade passed over an elevation from which the magnificent spectacle of the battlefield was presented—bands were playing, general and staff officers and gallant couriers were riding in front of, and between, the lines, a hundred battle-flags were waving in the smoke of battle, and bursting shells were wreathing in the air with great circles of smoke, while 20,000 brave men were marching in perfect order against the foe. General Gist ordered the charge in concert with General Gordon. In passing from the left to the right of the regiment the general waved his hat to us, expressing his pride and confidence in the Twenty-Fourth, and rode away in the smoke of battle, never more to be seen by the men he had commanded on so many fields."

Colonel R. W. Banks of Mississippi relates a pathetic incident. A soldier had been allowed to drop out of ranks for a short time to visit father's home. The young man brought some provisions for a lieutenant of his company. Others were invited to the feast, eight in all.

"To those wearied, war-torn, hungered veterans it was a feast deemed fit for the gods. The meal was eaten in haste, each officer with his belt buckled on and sidearms in place, for momentarily they were expecting orders to move upon the enemy in the fortified town. While eating, the impending battle was freely discussed by those eight officers, all of whom were in serious, thoughtful mood. Two only were optimistic. The other six took a gloomy view of the situation. The latter frankly expressed the opinion that the approaching battle would end the chapter of their respective lives."

Before the sun went down six of the officers were mortally wounded and the other two badly disabled. A captain and lieutenant of the same company fell at the same moment and seventeen men of their company fell near them. Such things as these were going on in that line of battle confronting our forces.

WITHIN THE FEDERAL LINE.

It may be presumed that our men in the works had something of the same feeling of suspense that always precedes an actual engagement. The writer knows well the feeling of the exposed front line. We were in a helpless position. Two brigades were a trifling force to oppose the twenty-two brigades that Hood threw into the fight. At that time a command always tried to throw up some kind of fortifications, if possible. We did gather some rails and loose logs that we could pick up, but we had no entrenching tools. Our trifling shelter might have afforded slight protection to a picket line lying down, but it was useless to shield a line of battle. We knew some one had blundered and we did reason why and ask why with a great deal of seriousness. Yet I saw no man inclined to flinch. Captain John K. Shellenberger of the Sixty-fourth Ohio in Conrad's brigade, records this touching incident. There was in his regiment a young sergeant who was a fine specimen of a man and one of the best volunteer soldiers. He was a non-veteran and the three-year enlistment had expired some time before. He and other men of that class were to have been mustered out on reaching Nashville. This young soldier said emphatically that he objected to being killed on account of some one's blunder. He made two or three movements as if to go back to the works. Others in the same class were ready to follow. The captain called him back with an oath. In the retreat a few minutes later the young soldier was killed. Such

incidents were too frequent in 1864 when the term of service of the non-veterans expired. If a man enlisted for three years and should leave one day before his time had expired, he could be treated as a deserter. He was often kept several weeks after his term of enlistment had expired, and he had no redress. A goodly number of men were killed under those circumstances.

Of course Schofield and Cox both put the blame on Wagner. They made him the scapegoat. Schofield in his book says he had given orders for the army to cross to the north bank of the river at dark. That order presumed that there would be no fight in front of the town. This was in harmony with Wagner's written orders to keep his division out in front and cross the river after dark. Near our line of works west of the pike was the home of a Mr. Carter, mentioned by all who have written about the fight. Here Cox established his headquarters. It was the fitting place as it was near the center of his corps. Mr. Carter with some solicitude inquired whether he should remove his family. He was advised to keep them there unless a battle should begin. The family had no warning to leave and remained until it was too late. Then they all took refuge in the cellar. Referring to this episode Cox wrote in his second volume:

"I thought it most probable at that time Hood would not attack in front. The very thoroughness of our preparation to meet an assault was a reason why he should not make it. It seemed wise for the family to remain as they were till they saw that a battle was about to open and then hasten into the village."

This gives Cox's view of the possible attack in front late in the afternoon.

A BROKEN COUPLET.

Dr. H. M. Field, the famous editor, went to the battlefield years after, but early enough to meet prominent citizens who were present at the time of the fight. Colonel McEwen said that Kimball made his headquarters at his house. About four o'clock Kimball went forward toward the works and a colonel lingered. The colonel asked for some music and the ladies began to sing, "Just Before the Battle, Mother." They had sung the selection only part way through when a shell burst a few yards away. Colonel McEwen then said to his visitor, "Colonel, if I am any judge, it is just about that time now." The young officer started for the works, but was shot through the body and was taken back to Nashville. About four months later when he had recovered sufficiently, he came back to Franklin to hear the rest of that song. "His wife and more

than a dozen officers accompanied him. He found the ladies and they sang and played the piece through for him in the presence of all the officers; and they wept like children."

These incidents, trivial in themselves, show how the leading officers felt as to a possible battle. The divisions that occupied the works have been named already, but the brigades should be given for the sake of historical accuracy. Cox's division was east of the pike and the brigade commanders were Stiles, Casement, and Reilly. Reilly was in temporary command of the division. Ruger's division was west of the pike. The two brigade commanders were Strickland and Moore. Kimball's division was on the extreme right and his brigade commanders were Grose, Kirby and Whitaker. Opdycke's brigade was in reserve back of the Carter house. Two regiments of Reilly's brigade came in late and were placed back of his other regiments as a reserve.

HOOD'S ARMY.

Hood's army was composed of three corps commanded by Stewart, Cheatham and Lee. Each corps had three divisions and each division had about three brigades. The following table gives the names of the division and brigade commanders of each corps.

Stewart's Corps.

French's Division	Walthall's Division.	Loring's Division.
Cockerell's Brigade, Sear's Brigade.	Reynold's Brigade, Shelley's Brigade, Quarle's Brigade.	Adams' Brigade, Featherston's Brig., Scott's Brigade.

Cheatham's Corps.

Cleburne's Division.	Brown's Division.	Bate's Division.
Polk's Brigade, Govan's Brigade, Granbury's Brigade.	Gordon's Brigade, Strahl's Brigade, Carter's Brigade, Gist's Brigade.	Finley's Brigade, Jackson's Brigade, Smith's Brigade.

Lee's Corps.

Johnson's Division.

Brantly's Brigade, Deas' Brigade, Manigault's Brig. Sharp's Brigade.

The other two divisions of Lee's corps were commanded by Clayton and Stevenson. They were in the rear in the

march from Columbia and were not brought into the assault at all. In addition to the infantry Forrest had four divisions of cavalry. The statement is made that after the army was

"THE BATTLE WILL BE FOUGHT HERE."

deployed for battle Forrest rode up to Hood and said to him, "General, I can cross the river and flank them out of this position." Hood is said to have reflected a moment and then remarked, "No, the battle will be fought here." The determining factor in his decision, doubtless, was that at Nashville he would have to meet a larger army after A. J. Smith and other reenforcements had come up. Forrest did throw a part of his cavalry across the river, one division, for the purpose of annoying our extreme left and also to threaten our train. Wilson attacked this force with his cavalry and after a spirited fight drove it across the river.

So much has been said about Wagner's two brigades left out in front that it is but fitting to give the names of the regiments of which they were composed. On the left of the Columbia pike was Conrad's brigade composed of the 42d Ill., 51st Ill., 79th Ill., 15th Mo., 64th Ohio, 65th Ohio. On the right of the pike, to the west, was Lane's brigade composed of the 100th Ill., 40th Ind., 57th Ind., 28th Ky., 26th Ohio, 97th Ohio.

PECULIAR INSPIRATION OF THE CONFEDERATES.

There were several things that inspired the Confederates to fight as they had never fought on any battlefield before. Cheatham's corps and Stewart's corps were friendly rivals, each claiming to be the superior in fighting ability. Here for the first time they were deployed in an open plain so that each could see the work of the other. The generals had been stung by the rebuke of Hood in the morning and each was determined that there should be no ground for censure that day. Besides, some forty-two of the regiments in that advancing battle line were Tennesseans and there were others in the artillery and cavalry. These men felt not a little exhilaration at being on their native soil once more. This feeling was intensified by the fact that they had seen their foe fall back before them at Pulaski, Columbia, and Spring Hill. Now they saw their enemy with a river in their rear and they had this determination that they would drive their opponents into the river. They know well that, if they should do this, there was no army to keep them from the Ohio River. This thought also animated the men on the defensive that day. Moreover, there were in Hood's army not a few who lived in Franklin and it

was a delight again to see their native town. They were advancing over fields familiar to their boyhood, where they had often joined in youthful sports. They felt that a victory there would mean more than a victory elsewhere. Is it any wonder that Franklin was one of the hardest fought battles of the war? Had Schofield been a military genius, he would have formed his line with the river in front of him and not in his rear.

It should be noted that Hood and Schofield had been classmates at West Point. Schofield boasted that he knew his classmate so thoroughly that he could anticipate his very movements. Yet Hood fooled him at Columbia and Franklin both. Hood had a wonderful amount of dash and daring, but physically he was hardly fitted for the hardships of an active campaign in the field. He had lost a leg and an arm in battle. He had his headquarters near the foot of Winstead Hill. He lay on a blanket during most of the fight and received his information from aids who rode to and from the front.

FORT GRANGER OPENS THE BATTLE.

It may be said that in a way the artillery opened the fight. On the north side of the river stood Fort Granger and a battery was placed there. The Twenty-third corps artillery had crossed the river and the Fourth corps artillery had been given places in the hastily constructed works where the guns did wonderful execution in repelling the attack later. While the Confederates were making their movements in the open plain before the city, our large guns in Fort Granger sent shells over our heads into the ranks of the advancing army. One who was present with the Confederate army said that General Cleburne formed his division in a hollow square and made them a speech. He told them that they would have to go forward without the use of their artillery as it had not yet arrived. He also told them they must not fire a shot until they crossed the first line of works. The latter command was given to save their ammunition and to make greater speed in the final rush.

The suspense and the nervous strain became greater and greater as the time passed and the lines of grey came nearer and nearer. We stood up a part of the time and a part of the time we sat down with our guns resting on the rails or logs in front. Our part of the line on the extreme right bent back some and for that reason we were a little farther from the advancing line than those on the left. We heard some firing on the left and turning our eyes in that direction we saw the

line had given way and was running toward the works closely followed by the Confederates. Our whole line did the same. The Confederates said to each other, "Let us go in with them." Indeed, that was the safest thing for them to do. We formed a screen so that our men in the works could not fire at the advancing foe. Indeed it was a foot race toward the entrenched line. We did not fire while thus retreating and the Confederates did not fire either. I saw no man fall, no man wounded. The nearest point to the works would have taken us through the locust grove so often mentioned and, not knowing what entanglements we might meet there, we naturally bore a little to the right, thinking that if we should meet such obstructions, we might go in on the pike. I jumped over the works just east of the locust grove near what proved to be the Carter house. Finding the works practically empty, we stopped and as soon as our men seemed to be in we began to fire as rapidly as possible. The batteries on both sides began to fire with great rapidity into the advancing ranks. Soon a cloud of smoke hung over us and nothing was distinct in front.

BEHIND THE WORKS.

We had fired several times in quick succession and, as I lifted my gun to fire again, a man jumped on the works almost directly in front of me and shouted, "Stop firing, boys, the men are not all in yet." I was horrified at the thought that we might have begun firing too soon and lowered my gun. Instantly there was a commotion on our left in the direction of the pike. I turned my eyes in that direction and saw the line giving way and the Confederates pouring over the works. I have wondered about the man who jumped on the works and I am inclined to think he was not one of our men, but one of the Confederates.

Our line was carried back and I went to the rear of the Carter house for a minute. This was about the time that Opdycke made his famous charge to restore the line. I saw nothing that looked like a charge, as those advancing had to divide in two parts to pass the Carter house. The line that I was in seemed to surge back as those at the pike gave way and then to move forward to what must have been a second line of works. On this point eye witnesses differ. Opdycke asserted there was no second line of fortifications. Naturally an opening was left on the pike for the artillery and wagons to enter. To protect this opening a spur had been built across the pike a short distance in the rear and this second line extended west beyond the Carter house.

The line was now restored and never again broken in the fight which raged four or five hours. I would hardly feel like asserting with absolute certainty whether it was the advanced line or second line where I stood. Some of the Confederates were on the opposite side of the works from us. When a lull would occur some of these would offer to surrender. We would cry out, "Drop your guns and climb over." This they did and this was repeated a number of times. Some of them crossed the works so close to me that I could have touched them with my hand. In the part of the line where I stood were men of many commands. As I have indicated it was Strickland's brigade that was originally in the line and gave way. One of Opdycke's officers claimed that his brigade and his brigade alone restored the line. This is absurd. Much praise belongs to this brigade and to the 12th and 16th Kentucky who did a similar work east of the pike in restoring the line where Reilly's brigade gave way. But the Confederates in front and our reserve in the rear both knew that the works were the safest place and both sought its shelter. Indeed Opdycke's men started for the works before any orders had been given. In our part of the line men from several different regiments were intermingled and every man knew that the supreme thing was to hold the works and every man did his duty. No battle was ever more truly won by those in the ranks. The officers did all that was for them to do. Then ran back and got ammunition and spread it on the works before us so that we could fire rapidly. We used our cartridge boxes very little. In the heat of battle we did not always draw our ramrods from the guns.

Two Confederates dropped behind the works just opposite a man in my company. He fired at each of them, but of course he could not tell with what result. He was a very conscientious and modest man, and he simply remarked, "They did not move. If I had killed them they would not have moved. If I had missed them, they would not have moved." A colonel of one of our commands jumped upon the works and called on the men in the line to follow him. We knew a charge by a few men would be foolish; that the thing for us to do was to hold the works at all hazards. This we did. A ball pierced the man and he fell a few feet to my left. It was rumored at the time that he was from a Missouri regiment, but Cox says it was Colonel Stockton of the 72nd Ill. Stretcher bearers from the rear came and asked for the officer who had been shot. I wondered at the time how it was known back in the rear.

Just east of the pike Reilly's line also gave way. General Gordon of Brown's division and a number of his men got inside of our works and were captured. Four guns near the pike loaded with canister were captured by the Confederates and an attempt was made to use them on Reilly's men in the trench, but they were recaptured before they could be fired. The lines east and west of the center where Wagner's men reached the works, did not break at all.

HOW MANY CHARGES WERE MADE?

There have been disputes as to how many charges actually were made. It seemed to us that there were many. Some of our Confederate friends say there was but one. What was true in one part of the line might not have been true in another. Most certainly, after an interval of silence the firing would be renewed and we would hear the Rebel yell. A moment later there would be a Yankee yell and we always thought we put more volume into our yell than did our opponents across the works. To me their voices seemed pitched to a higher key than ours. The attacking line did not all reach our works at the same time. Naturally those opposite the two advanced brigades ran as fast as they could so as to be protected by the retreating forces. Doubtless some of the others moved toward the pike as probably affording a better place to cross. So in reality there were several attacks. Each brigade had a reserve and when this struck our line this really meant a new charge. Colonel Ellison Capers of the Twenty-fourth South Carolina in his report states that companies of his regiment made an attack on our line as late as ten or half past ten o'clock and captured the flag of the 97th Ohio and took several prisoners. The firing continued from four o'clock until ten or eleven. General Stanley reports that nearly one hundred wagon loads of ammunition were expended in that fight, giving some idea of the amount of lead that went over that field of carnage. The awfulness of the struggle is more apparent when we remember that the fight did not last three days, as did other battles, nor did it cover many miles in its battle front, nor did the armies number 150,000 soldiers. The battle line only covered about a mile and the real conflict only covered half a mile. The battle lasted only a few hours and the number engaged numbered only forty or fifty thousand men. But I have given little conception of the actual battle. Who can describe a cyclone, an earthquake, the blowing up of a great factory, or the sudden sinking of a great ship by a submarine?

As the evening drew on and it became a little colder, the cries of the wounded and dying in front of the works were heartrending. Usually they cried for water or perhaps some young boy in his delirium was asking for his mother. Nothing could be done for their relief. The loss of life was appalling. The proportion of killed compared with the wounded must have been larger than in most battles. Those wounded in the first of the conflict may have been killed as they tried to withdraw, and if they fell upon the ground they were struck again. A few of our men were taken prisoners right out of the works, one of them a man from my regiment. The little squad was started to the rear guarded by two Confederate soldiers. They had not gone far when one of the guards was killed. The other guard and the prisoners reached the rear in safety. An aid reported to Hood that Cheatham had gained a part of the works, but must have reinforcements. "How does Cheatham estimate his loss?" asked Hood. "At one-half of his whole command in killed and wounded," was the reply. Then Hood exclaimed, "O my God, this awful day!"

DUTY'S STERN DEMAND.

Sam Jones used to give an illustration like this in one of his stirring sermons to show the stern demand of duty. When our line was first broken and the Confederate flag could be seen inside our works, Hood was naturally led to think that the advantage gained was greater than it was. He summoned an aid to him and said:

"My compliments to General Cleburne and tell him to take those works at all hazards."

The aid dashed into the smoke of battle and soon returned and said, "General Cleburne is dead, sir."

"My compliments to General Adams and tell him to take those works at all hazards."

Again the aid returned with the message, "General Adams is dead, sir."

"My compliments to General Gist and tell him to take those works at all hazards."

A third time the aid came back and said, "General Gist is dead, sir."

"My compliments to General Strahl and tell him to take those works at all hazards."

The aid returned in a short time to announce that General Strahl was wounded.

About ten o'clock there was a lull in the firing and I moved a few feet to my left to find a place where the works were not so badly crowded. I got into a conversation with a man in my company and we spoke about the hard conflict. He had been promoted to a corporal not long before. He was one of

the few married men of the company and had had a furlough after the Atlanta campaign. Soon the Rebel yell was heard, the bullets came over as fast as before, and I moved back to my old place. This man did not appear at Nashville and on inquiry it was found that I was the last one to see him. He was probably killed in that last attack. At least he was not found in any of the hospitals and was never heard of in any prison.

MISTAKEN FOR A DEAD MAN!

I was almost completely worn out. As I have indicated we had had no chance to prepare anything to eat since the morning before, about forty hours. We had fought two battles. Fighting is harder work than many realize. It is a wonderful drain on one's nervous force. For some six hours we stood there and fired. I had shot some two hundred times. The three hours that we stood out in front watching the enemy advance and wondering why we were not brought back was actually harder than the fighting. I leaned my head against the works and I suppose dropped asleep almost instantly as the firing had about ceased. About midnight a man placed his hand on my shoulder and shook me. I was aroused and he said to me, "Do you know the army has crossed the river?" When he saw me he did not know whether I was dead or alive. A few pickets had been scattered along the line and were firing occasionally to conceal the retreat of our army. I passed back of the Carter house and there lay a good many of our wounded who did not seem to realize that they were soon to fall into the hands of the enemy.

I hastened across the river and fortunately I came upon a man of my company. He was a sharpshooter and had been back in the town to mold some bullets. He had also taken time to make himself some coffee. This had left him somewhat refreshed. He rendered me assistance and I owe my escape to him. I could not walk more than a third of a mile until I would have to drop on the ground for rest. Instantly I would go to sleep. He would let me sleep two or three minutes and then arouse me and we would go on about the same distance and stop again. It was a rather slow way to retreat, but it was better than being captured. By daylight I was more refreshed and my companion became drowsy. I would let him sleep a few minutes, as I had done, and then I would wake him. I passed some troops who evidently had not been in the fight. One of them remarked to another as they saw me pass, "That fellow has been in it." I suppose my face was as black as powder in fact. I stopped at the first creek and made a hasty

toilet. It must have been nearly noon when I reached Nashville where the battle line was formed. I presume I got something to eat, but I have no recollection of this. I threw myself on the ground and slept till the next morning. It was not so cold as it became two or three days later. General Schofield recounts his own experience on reaching Nashville. He had caught a few hours' sleep in the forenoon at Franklin and he had a horse to ride. He suffered the nervous strain of commander, which was great. He says: "I rode to the hotel in Nashville, went to bed, and slept from about noon of the 1st, without waking to full consciousness, until about sunset the next day." These incidents make it clear that the commander and the men who served in the ranks were completely worn out by the three days' experience.

THE AWFUL CARNAGE.

No one who actually fought in the ranks and not even the commander could know the loss until the reports were made. The loss of the Confederates was 1,750 buried next morning. The number wounded was estimated at 3,800. The prisoners taken were more than a thousand, but there seems to be some confusion in making the returns. The Federal dead numbered 189, the wounded 1,104, the missing 1,033. A few years after the war a correspondent from the east induced General Cheatham to go to Franklin and tell of the fight and especially the appearance of things the next morning after the battle. The old warrior said: "About 11 the Federals withdrew and about 2 o'clock I rode into town and got a bite to eat, the first I had tasted that day. Just at daybreak I rode upon the field and such a sight I never saw and can never expect to see again. The dead were piled up like shocks of wheat or scattered about like sheafs of grain. You could have walked all over the field upon dead bodies without stepping upon the ground. The fierce flame of battle had nearly all been confined within a range of fifty yards, excepting the cavalry fight on the other side of the river. Almost under your eye nearly all the dead, wounded, and dying lay. In front of the Carter house the bodies lay in heaps and to the right of it a locust thicket had been mowed off by bullets as if by a scythe. It is a wonder that any man escaped alive from that storm of iron missiles. This is the first time I have visited this battlefield since the fight took place and I have talked more of the events of the war today than during all the past fifteen years. I have never read a true story of this battle."

There were five Confederate generals killed: Cleburne,

Adams, Gist, Strahl, and Granbury. Six were wounded: Brown, Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott. Gordon was captured. After the fight was over, the ranking officer in Quarles' brigade and Gist's brigade was in both cases a captain. General Adams fell near the works and was cared for tenderly by his foes as life slowly ebbed away. His watch and other valuables were taken and later returned, under a flag of truce, to his family. Mr. Carter, who lived in the house so often mentioned in connection with the battle, says that he counted fifty-seven dead besides the wounded in his door-yard the next morning.

One of the pathetic incidents of the battle was the death of Mr. Carter's son, Captain Theodoric Carter. He was a quartermaster and duty did not require that he should go into the battle. He volunteered to serve as a staff officer and was leading the advancing line when he was mortally wounded less than two hundreds yards away from his father's house. After the firing ceased, a horseman brought word to Mr. Carter. Members of the family with lighted lanterns went out on the battlefield to look for the loved one. It was a gruesome task to look into the faces of the dead and dying at the midnight hour. At last there was a scream from the sister and the young officer was tenderly carried into his old home. He lived thirty-six hours, but could not tell anything about his part in the battle. He died as a young hero. It is not strange that writers on the Confederate side and also on the Federal side have confused the two Carters mentioned in the battle. Not a few have said that it was General Carter who was wounded and died in his father's home. The General Carter wounded did not belong to this family at all. The son mortally wounded was Captain Carter, a young lawyer and staff officer. The incident is sad in the extreme, but not so sad as the thousands of cases when the dying soldier could not be caressed by loved ones in his own home.

WORK OF THE FEDERAL CAVALRY.

The efficient work of the cavalry at Columbia has been mentioned. General Wilson had his force fall back as the enemy advanced and then took a position north of the Harpeth River, two or three miles east of Franklin. The infantry and the cavalry had no communication with each other during the day, but each surmised about what the other must be doing. Both were busy. Hood sent Chalmer's division of cavalry against our extreme right, hoping to turn that flank, but the attack was feeble and easily repulsed. Next Hood threw a

part of his cavalry across the river at our extreme left with the intent of reaching the rear of Schofield's army. General Wilson promptly met this movement with a vigorous attack and after a sharp fight Forrest was driven back to the south side of the river. This fight took place two or three miles from Franklin proper, but we heard nothing of it. Soon after dark General Wilson rode over to General Schofield's headquarters. Then the two generals had the first communication with each other that they had had since leaving Columbia. Wilson was surprised to learn that a hard battle had been fought in front of Franklin and the Confederates had been repulsed. Indeed, the fighting was still going on at intervals. Schofield was delighted to learn that Wilson had driven Forrest back across the river. There was no longer any solicitude about the wagon train nor a cavalry attack on the retreat to Nashville. Wilson makes no mention of his loss in the official report.

SOME INCIDENTS.

Numerous interesting incidents are related by those who participated in the great battle. A Confederate officer stated, after the Federals had crossed the river, he found a Federal officer badly wounded. The wounded officer told the Confederate to take his pocketbook as some one would get it. It had several government bonds in it. The Confederate officer got some men and had the wounded Federal officer taken to a house not far away. He asked the lady to receive him in the home. She said she would not like to do this as her husband was fighting under Lee at Richmond. He finally persuaded her to receive the wounded officer into her house. The Confederate officer handed her the man's pocketbook and told her not to let any one know about it. In two weeks Hood's army came back badly defeated and the Federal troops took possession of the town. The Union officer had been carefully nursed and was soon able to be taken to Nashville. As he was about to be removed from the lady's house, she handed him his pocketbook and that was the first he knew that she had it. It is hoped that he handed her one of the bonds.

Two boys, Park Marshall and H. P. Figuers, lived in Franklin at the time of the battle and witnessed the horrors of the struggle. Both became lawyers and have related many thrilling events that they personally saw. Mr. Marshall has given accurate information as to the line of works. Mr. Figuers, boylike, climbed houses and trees to get a good view of the two armies in battle array. When the bullets began to cut close to him he went to his mother's house and sought shelter

in the cellar. When a cannon ball struck a sill of the house near his head, he thought it time to retreat from that place. Soon he began to assist his mother in caring for the wounded Confederate prisoners. One incident, related by Mr. Figuers, shows with what determination the Confederates entered upon the battle and that in some of them the fighting spirit was not crushed even when they were badly wounded. In the morning he found one Confederate with his back against something for a support. He noticed that his lower jaw had been shot away and his tongue and under lip were hanging down his breast. The boy was moved with compassion and asked him whether he could do anything for him. The man had a short pencil and an envelope, and wrote, "No. Hood will be in New York in three weeks." When men go into battle with that spirit, it is no wonder that they fight with great determination.

FRANKLIN WAS NOT A MINOR CONFLICT.

The exact location of the troops in the battle has been compiled from the reports. Those of us in the advance line did not know what troops held the line in the works. Nor did we know any more about this while we were fighting and repulsing the fierce attacks. We knew that we had need of all the forces there and each sought to do his duty and we had no thought that any controversy would arise in the passing years. It is the testimony of Confederate and Federal soldiers alike that it was the hardest battle that any of them fought in the West. Those who fought in other battles and were not at Franklin are rather inclined to speak of this fight as one of the minor conflicts. Yet the great loss of life on the part of those making the assault reveals the awfulness of the fight. Captain Frederick Phisterer's Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States gives some interesting facts as to losses. The Federal loss at Shiloh was 1,735 dead and this was a two days' fight, while the Confederates lost 1,750 dead at Franklin in a few hours, the most of it in one hour. The Federal loss at Stone River was 1,533 killed and this was a three days' fight. The Federal loss at Chickamauga was 1,647 and this was a two days' fight with larger armies. The brilliant attack on Missionary Ridge incurred a loss of only 757 killed. In the Atlanta campaign, which lasted from May 3 to September 3, Sherman reports a loss of 1,408 in killed and missing. These figures show plainly that in no battle of the West, which lasted in some cases two or three days' did the Federal army lose as many as did the Confederates at Franklin. The comparison

is all the more striking when we consider the size of the armies and the time consumed in the fight.

A few days after the fight we found that General Wagner had asked to be relieved from his command and we regretted to have him go. The reason we did not know and possibly we did not even conjecture that he had been criticized in some way. In 1882 General Cox's first book came out giving his version of the fight. Many of us were astonished to find this statement, "He (Wagner) rallied the disorganized brigade at the river, but they were not again carried into action." This seemed strange language to us who had remained in the works till the last gun was fired. Of course, we did not see the official reports, but we knew this was a misstatement of facts or a gross misrepresentation. The fact is, that as commandant of the line, Cox blundered in not bringing those two brigades back to the works two hours before the battle really opened, and he naturally sought to put the blame on a subordinate. This has been done too often. In this case Wagner was made the scapegoat and he had to bear the blame of a superior officer.

COX'S REPORTS OF THE BATTLE.

Cox even says in his later book: "Nothing is more notorious in regard to military report than that they are apologetic in cases of mishap, and no form of glossing the facts is more common than the omission of unpleasant features whilst more creditable ones are amplified." General Cox's own accounts of this battle illustrate the general principle that he has thus stated so clearly. On the preceding day Hood had ordered a subordinate to attack our army passing on the pike at Spring Hill. He failed to do this and Hood asked to have Cheatham relieved. Commenting on this incident in the Confederate army, Cox says: "A commander who is personally with the head of the column in such a movement and on the field, has the means of enforcing his orders by direct commands to the divisions." Cox seems to think this principle should not be applied to him. The Confederate army had been in view for at least three hours and Cox saw it all this time, yet he failed to insist that the two brigades be brought in. Of course, Schofield must bear his share of the responsibility, too. It is interesting to note Cox's two official reports of the battle. It is unusual for an officer to make more than one report. His first report was made December 2, two days after the fight. In this he says: "At three o'clock the enemy engaged the two brigades of Wagner's division, which, in accordance with orders, fell leisurely back within our lines and the action became general

along the entire front." Why he should state that the brigades fell back leisurely is hard to say. Every one present knew it was a foot race.

On December 10 he made a second report in which he says: "General Wagner rallied the two brigades of his division at the river, but they were not again brought into action." This implies that the two brigades had no part in the fight excepting the skirmish in front as we began to retreat. The loss of the two brigades tells a very different story. The trail of blood usually tells where the fighting is done. Let us note the official reports of the losses. The Second Division of the Twenty-third corps had three brigades and the loss in that command was 307. The Third Division of the Twenty-third corps had three brigades also, and the loss in that command was 330; that is, the six brigades of the Twenty-third corps lost 637 men in killed, wounded and missing. In Lane's brigade of Wagner's Division the loss was 418. Conrad's brigade lost 397; that is, the two brigades in front lost 815. The artillery lost 67 men, but not all of them belonged to the two brigades. Thus it will be seen that the two brigades of Wagner lost more than the whole Twenty-third corps. Do not these losses help to tell the story of the fighting? Much praise is given to Opdycke's brigade for its part in the fight and it deserves great praise. Yet its loss was but 216. Those who hold the opinion that Wagner's Division did not bear the brunt of the fight cannot possibly explain the large loss. Both Cox and Schofield carry the impression that this great loss took place out in front. Cox says in his first book, in speaking of the losses: "More than one thousand were in the brigades of Wagner which were so unnecessarily compromised at the front." As an eye-witness of what took place in the advanced line and in the hurried retreat, I absolutely know that our loss in front was insignificant—very small indeed.

DISTINGUISHED CORRESPONDENCE.

I wrote to General Cox and a correspondence followed. I was anxious to have the testimony of a competent and disinterested witness concerning the matter. So I wrote to Governor James D. Porter of Tennessee. He was a member of General Cheatham's staff, was in the fight, and was on the battlefield the next morning and I knew he was entirely reliable. This was only seventeen years after the battle, when a man's memory is clearer than fifty years later. I asked him what the Federal loss was in the two brigades, and whether they were many of the Federal dead any distance in front of the works

the next morning. He replied that perhaps fifteen or twenty were wounded in front, threw down their arms and surrendered. He also stated that there were no Federal dead or wounded any distance in front of the works the next morning. This confirmed my own observation exactly. A few weeks later he wrote me again and said he had had a conversation with General Cheatham and others about my question and they put the loss even less than he had stated. A loss of fifteen or twenty is very different from Cox's statement of more than a thousand. Governor Porter in referring to Cox's claim added:

"If Wagner retired to the river for a rallying point, he would have been not less than one mile and a fourth from the battlefield and could not have sustained the loss of a man. He would not only have had the benefit of the distance, but he would have been protected by the town of Franklin which would have been between him and the Federal line of battle."

No, Wagner's brigade did not lose men at the river, because the distance was too great and they were not there. They did not sustain their great loss out in front, as Federals and Confederates both testify. Where did they meet with their great loss, which surpassd that of the six brigades of the Twenty-third corps? It could have taken place at but one point, and that was near the pike and in front of the Carter house where the battle raged the fiercest. The Confederate General, G. W. Gordon who was captured at the works says:

"When all was ready, the charge was ordered. The enemy (Wagner's two brigades) delivered one volley at our rushing ranks, and precipitately fled for refuge to his main and rear line. The shout was raised, 'Go into the works with them!' This cry was taken up and vocifered from a thousand throats as we rushed on after the flying forces we had routed, killing some in our running fire and capturing others who were slow of foot, sustaining but small losses ourselves until we arrived within one hundred paces of their main line and stronghold, when it seemed to me that hell itself had exploded in our faces. The enemy had thus long reserved their fire for the safety of their routed comrades who were flying to them for protection and who were just in front of and mingled with the pursuing Confederates. When it became no longer safe for themselves to reserve their fire they opened upon us (regardless of their own men who were mingled with us) such a hailstorm of shot and shell, musketry and canister, that the very atmosphere was hideous with the shrieks of the messengers of death. The booming of cannon, the bursting of bombs, the rattle of musketry, the shrieking of shells, the whizzing of bullets, the shouting of hosts, and the falling of men in their struggle for victory, all make a scene of surpassing terror and awful grandeur."

WAGNER'S BRIGADES A SCREEN TO THE CONFEDERATES

This scene so graphically described took place just east of the pike. Our two retreating brigades formed a screen to pro-

tect the Confederates and both armies knew that the line of works was the place of safety if there was such a place. In such a race there was little firing in the very nature of things. Five of Lane's regiments went back with loaded guns and did deadly work when they opened fire. According to Gordon, some of our men were killed by our own fire as they neared the works intermingled with the enemy. This is very probable. Wagner's Division had 670 reported missing. Some of these were from Odycke's brigade which was not out in front at all. As has been stated a few, a dozen or two, were taken out in front. Some were taken out of the works in the conflict. One was taken out of the works from my regiment, not far from me. The Twenty-Third Corps reported 379 missing and that command was not outside of the works at all. Some were worn out in all the commands and dropped asleep near the works and were taken the next morning. Probably many were thus taken the next day on the retreat. Two days marching and fighting, and two nights without sleep proved too much for many a weary soldier.

General Cox has had a wide hearing in what he says about the battle. He made two official reports and this is somewhat unusual. The reports do not agree, as has been shown. He criticised Stanley for making even one report. The wound that Stanley received necessitated a leave of absence for some weeks. Two days after the fight General Wood assumed command of the corps and he made the report of the battle tho he had not been in command. General Cox was in many ways a distinguished soldier. Soon after the campaign closed the Twenty-third corps was transferred to Sherman's army in the East. Cox and Schofield were received as heroes in Washington and both were promoted. After the war Cox resumed the practice of law and later was at the head of a law school. He held a cabinet position under Grant, served in Congress, and was governor of Ohio. A man of such prominence would naturally be considered as an authority when in 1882 he published his "Franklin and Nashville."

"FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE".

His book, as a historical study, is valuable in giving the ordinary movements of the different commands, but it called out severe criticisms from those who knew he had not done justice to Wagner's command. These criticisms, and they came from various sources, probably prompted him to write a second book on the same subject in 1897, called "The Battle of Franklin." This book is more elaborate and gives extracts

from the official records. More details are given as to the different commands, but when it comes to discussing Wagner's command he falls into the same error as before, or rather he attempts to bolster up his former statement. In this particular no one can think of him as the calm historian, weighing evidence carefully and striving to reach the exact truth. One must think of him as an advocate striving to make out his case and twisting the evidence to his purpose. The stronger the case that he can make against Wagner, the more nearly does he vindicate himself in his mistake which nearly caused the overthrow of the army.

Some one was responsible for the blunder. Was it the commandant or a subordinate? The case deserves careful consideration. Two things are involved: Was Wagner the man to blame? Was Wagner's command in the fight or at the river in the rear? The written order of Wagner to take his command across the river after dark has already been cited. It is claimed that there was a verbal direction or order from Cox to withdraw if pressed too strongly. How much discretion was Wagner expected to exercise? Had the battlefield been a long one as at Stone river or Atlanta, his judgment would have been a strong factor. As it was both armies were in the open field, visible to the commander and the rank and file. Over Wagner was Cox, the commandant of the line. Over him was Schofield. Stanley could have given orders to retire. These higher commanders plainly thought that Hood was only planning to get near enough to annoy the Federal army while the cavalry might cross the river above or below. If Wagner had retired too early and the enemy had pushed forward close enough to harass our line and not made the assault, Wagner could have been blamed for timidity.

CAPT. SHELLENBERGER'S PAMPHLET.

Captain John K. Shellenberger of the Sixty-fourth Ohio, Conrad's brigade, made a very careful study of the battle and visited the place when citizens who saw the battle could be interviewed. He has published a pamphlet that illuminates the situation in several particulars. Captain Whitesides, Wagner's assistant adjutant-general, furnished Captain Shellenberger a written account of what passed under his eyes. About half past two Lane sent word to Wagner that Hood was forming apparently for an attack. Whitesides was directed to convey this information to Stanley. He found Stanley and Schofield both at the residence of Doctor Cliffe, near the center of the town, and gave them the information. Whitesides got the impression that both Cox and Wagner

at that time were of the opinion that Hood was about to make the assault, but neither of them would take the responsibility of ordering the brigades to retire with Schofield so near at hand. Some one had blundered seriously, but the responsible commanders have always sought to place the blame upon a subordinate. Captain Shellenberger, in a personal interview with Doctor Cliffe, learned some facts about Schofield's movements during the day. He came to the Doctor's house about nine o'clock and after breakfast retired to a room and slept till a little after noon. Stanley was really sick and he was there with Schofield. These men told the Doctor that there would be no fight, as Hood would not attack works, that after dinner they would ride on to Nashville and the army would follow after dark. At three o'clock, when Hood's army had already advanced, perhaps half way across that open field by slow stages, Schofield wired to Thomas at Nashville:

"He (Hood) has a large force, probably two corps, in my front and seems prepared to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing tomorrow in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night if he attempts it."

He does not say a word about a probable assault in front and it came as a shock a short time later. Then Schofield and Stanley mounted in hot haste and galloped away, Schofield to the north side of the river, where he established his headquarters, and Stanley toward the front where in the thick of the fight he was wounded in the neck and his horse was shot under him. Schofield's excited and disturbed mental condition is manifest in the fact that he left the house of the Doctor without taking his overcoat and the official dispatches from Thomas. Mrs. Cliffe saved the dispatches for him till his return in two weeks and preserved the coat from Confederate hands by wearing it herself.

It is interesting to note what higher commanders had to say about Wagner soon after the battle when every thing was fresh in mind. In writing to Wagner, on December 2, commanding Opdycke for promotion, Cox adds:

"I desire to express my admiration for the gallantry of your whole command. Indeed an excess of bravery kept the two brigades a little too long in front, so that the troops at the main line could not get to firing upon the advancing enemy till they were uncomfortably near."

When General Stanley was about to leave on account of his wound, he directed his assistant adjutant-general to send a note of appreciation to Wagner:

"When General Stanley left, he directed me to address you and express for him, to you and to the officers and men serv-

ing in your command, his sincere thanks and gratitude for the gallant service rendered at the battle of Franklin on the 30th of November." He then paid a high tribute to Wagner for his work in the past and expressed his confidence in him for the future. General Schofield said in his official report:

"I am under great obligations to the division commanders of the Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier-Generals Wood, Wagner, and Kimball."

Cox's SECOND Book.

In his second book Cox does not claim quite so strongly that Wagner's men did not fight in the line, but he discounts all claims to that effect. He says: "If Conrad's and Lane's brigades were in the main line, as nobody doubts Opdycke's was, then the whole of Wagner's division, excepting stragglers, was there." Then he claims that the brigade and regimental commanders were not seen there and so he concludes that the men were not there or only a few of them were in line. This is not conclusive testimony at all and the statement rather suggests the adroit lawyer rather than the careful investigation of the impartial historian. Some of the other testimony that he puts forward to bolster up his case would not be admitted in a court for a moment. He quotes from a letter written by Captain Sexton thirty years after the battle.


After that period a man's memory may not be very reliable. Captain Sexton says that not more than five hundred men of the two brigades stopped at the works. How did he find out and when did he make this estimate? I do not question the soldierly qualities of the Captain, but I doubt his ability to pass judgment on such a point. I presume or rather assume that Captain Sexton was a good soldier. If so, at the beginning of the fight, he must have been looking after his company. Of course, it was small as all companies were at that time. Soon the higher officers were disabled and as senior Captain he had to take command of the regiment. It was mixed up with other commands in the line. The soldiers all looked alike so far as their uniforms were concerned. In a few moments after the battle opened the smoke covered the battle-field so that one could not be recognized even a few feet away. The smoke of our guns, the smoke of the enemies' guns that flashed almost into our faces, the smoke from the batteries that were firing as fast as they could be loaded, formed a dense cloud over and about the two battle lines. How was Captain Sexton able to make any estimate of the men in other commands Does any one suppose he ever had any thought of trying to make an estimate at the time? Does

any one think he did anything so foolish as to go up and down the line, tap each man on the shoulder, and ask him what command he belonged to? The necessary thing also to do was to make a note of the answers and tabulate them. Does any one suppose that he did any thing so ridiculous as this? Perhaps so, for thirty years afterwards, when Cox wrote him to give an estimate, he promptly said that not more than five hundred men from the two brigades stopped at the works. The fact is that the regiment lost its flag in the struggle, but this was not known till afterwards. This reckless remark should be placed by the side of a remark made by some of Opdycke's men, who have said that, after the line broke, hardly a dozen men of Strickland's command went back to the works and fought. Neither remark can be substantiated.

AN UNGENEROUS REMARK.

Captain Sexton then adds a remark uncalled for and ungenerous in the extreme. He says: "I was informed that part of them (Wagner's brigades) were stopped at Wood's command near the river and the rest at Nashville." Captain Sexton is casting reproach upon men as brave as himself or any of his command. Suppose the Captain was giving testimony before a court, and Cox was the attorney on the opposite side, what would the distinguished lawyer say? He would probably remark: "We want you to state what you know, not what you have heard." But in pretending to write history he admits Sexton's reckless remark as evidence to bolster up a theory. It looks as if the General was hard up for evidence to substantiate his theory. The Captain did not seem very familiar with the forces that came back to the works, as he says in his official report there were two divisions of them, when any one familiar with the battle knows there were just two brigades.

Cox shows his determination not to write history, but to bolster up his former claim as to Wagner's command; he gives as evidence the statement of a staff officer that did not see Wagner, Conrad, or Lane, or other higher officers in the line. Such a statement would not be accepted as testimony in a court at all. Cox would not have admitted it if he had been a judge. As an advocate to strengthen his explanation he cites this statement as evidence in the case. During the whole of the battle the officers were not conspicuous. Many of them did good work in carrying ammunition and spreading it before us on the works. We did not use our cartridge boxes much. In the darkness and the smoke that covered the line and the whole battlefield, an officer could not easily be recognized.



This is the map Cox inserted in his last book. He marks the rifle pits out near the Columbia pike, but he does not indicate that they are the two brigades of Wagner left out there by the blunder of higher commanders. The map does not show that the two brigades were in the fight at all, yet they lost more men than did the whole Twenty-third corps.

I did not see Cox or his generals during the fight, but that would not be considered as evidence that they were not present. Doubtless thousands in the line would make similar statements. This would not be considered as real evidence that they were not present somewhere. The officers that passed along the line, and I assume that some of them did, of course passed in the rear of the firing line. Our faces were toward the front and we took no special note of things in the rear. There was no occasion to look that way often. I saw no mounted men moving along the line. If they did go on horseback, they were not wise to incur the additional danger. Those who made an investigation doubtless made the trip on foot. Cox does not show the characteristics of the candid and truth-searching historian in this investigation. If he can make out a case against Wagner, he in a way excuses his own blunder and Schofield's also. But he needs stronger evidence than he has given.

Cox's MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELD.


Another thing in his volume is inexcusable in a historian. The government has published an official map locating the different commands in the battle lines. Cox does not reproduce this at all or make any reference to it. Instead, he gives a different map, one calculated to substantiate his peculiar view in the eyes of those who do not investigate or are not familiar with the facts. Those two brigades of Wagner, that had been left in such a helpless situation, and who lost more than all the Twenty-Third corps, are not placed in the battle line at all! The two brigades left out in that hazardous position through the blunder of higher officers consisted of twelve regiments. Naturally the survivors of that command and their descendants take a good deal of interest in the part borne by those men in that awful conflict. Imagine their feelings when they turn to the so-called history and do not find those regiments placed anywhere in the battle line. Yet, as has been shown, those two brigades lost more men than did any other two brigades in the fight, more than did all the rest of the Fourth corps, more than did the whole of the Twenty-third corps. This map tends to distort the truth just as does Cox's written account. The map prepared by Captain Twining of the Twenty-third corps, does not mention Wagner's two brigades in front.

Why does Cox pretend to reproduce the map and leave out Wagner's name entirely? All other commands are given a place in line. The advanced position is marked "rifle pits," but no name is given to the command. What right had Cox to

omit that one name from the command that suffered most? The government publishes another map, that accompanied Wood's official report of the battle. This was made a few days after the fight when no controversy had arisen as to the location of commands. It is drawn by the topographical engineer of Lane's brigade of Wagner's division. This map does not cover the whole battle position, but locates that brigade in its three positions: the first on the elevation, perhaps two miles out in front of Franklin; then in its position designated as rifle pits by Twining; then in the works near the famous Locust grove so often mentioned. This I know to be the right position so far as one person can observe. The candid historian in a desire to give the real truth should have produced both maps.

'Cox says in a general way, when something unpleasant occurs in a battle, it is a common practice to gloss over the facts. This is exactly what Cox does to cover up his blunder. He constantly seeks to make Wagner the scapegoat for the mistake. Cox says in his first volume that the two brigades in front rallied at the river. The great loss of the two brigades, and they could not have lost any had they been back in the rear, the official reports of the commanders, and the testimony of the survivors disprove this completely. Cox modifies his first statement in his later work, but still belittles the work of Wagner's men. Several years after the war Cox and Stanley got into an unpleasant controversy as to who was the real commandant of the battle line. Cox claims he was and the order of Schofield seems to substantiate this claim. Cox had no right to place upon another the responsibility that rested upon himself.

Cox and his subordinates have had a good deal to say about the crowd back by the river. I know nothing about it. I was not there during the fight. At midnight when I went back to cross the river, there was no crowd there. I cannot help wondering why the officers of the Twenty-third corps seem so familiar with that crowd. Even after the darkness covered and hid everything, they seemed to recognize them as men of the Fourth corps. I wonder how this could be determined. In fact, I never heard that there was a bunch of stragglers there until Cox's book came out eighteen years after the battle. The strong presumption is that several commands may have been represented. There is a strong presumption that the command that sustained the heaviest loss must have been poorly represented in the rear.



This map was prepared by the engineer of the Second Brigade of the Second Division commanded by Wagner. It shows the position of the brigade when the battle lines were forming out some two miles from town on the elevation. The next position is at the place which Cox calls the rifle pits. The third position indicates the place occupied by the brigade in the works. This was made a few days after the battle and was a part of Colonel Lane's official report.

THE BREAK NEAR THE PIKE.

There has been considerable discussion as to why there was a break in the line near the pike. The common explanation is that Wagner's men coming back to the works in great haste caused a panic and so the line gave away. The retreat of Wagner's brigades was no doubt a factor in causing the break, but this does not explain it fully. Reilly's brigade on the left of the pike and Strickland's on the right of the pike gave way for a time, but the two adjoining brigades did not give way. Moore to the right of Strickland and Casement to the left of Reilly held the line. Yet some of Conrad's and some of Lane's men reached the works where these brigades were stationed. Another element must be considered, and this a very important one. As has been stated, an opening was left in the pike for the artillery and the wagons to enter. This opening was protected by a spur built across the pike extending west perhaps about as far as the locust grove. Those of us who were out in the front line could not see the works clearly and did not know how difficult the works would be to climb. We could see the grove and we did not know but that entanglements had been placed there to impede the progress of an attacking party. When the line broke in front and we started to retreat rapidly, there was one thought uppermost in mind, to find a convenient place to enter the works. We naturally thought it best to keep east of the locust grove and the lines converged toward the pike. In later years I talked with a captain of a Tennessee regiment who followed us in the charge. He said he found in the rush forward the Confederates were inclined to converge toward the pike also. To avoid a congestion at that place he and a lieutenant of the same company kept straight forward and passed through the grove, directing the men that way as far as possible. What happened when our line struck the works in the neighborhood of the pike? There was a congestion and a little delay in getting through the opening. By this time the Confederates were also crowding through the same opening. What was the situation at that moment? A number of the Confederates were actually in the rear of our lines that bordered on the pike. There was nothing to do but to fall back for the time. So the line broke near the pike on both sides of it. This does not mean that those who gave way in the confusion at the pike were less brave or soldierly than those in other parts of the line. This seems to me to be the correct explanation of the break in that part of the line. Any charge of unsoldier-like conduct is not justified.

Cox's SOLDIERLY QUALITIES.

I have criticised Cox as an historian touching his statements concerning Wagner's command and also criticised him in not bringing in those two brigades. Wagner did not take the initiative because his superior was near at hand. Cox did not assume the responsibility because his superior was just at hand. A few things should be said in favor of Cox's soldierly qualities. He should have credit for constructing that hasty line of works which made a victory possible. This is in his favor. He urged Schofield not to withdraw that night at all. Indeed, after the first assault and the re-establishing of the line after the break there was not slightest danger of a defeat for our line of battle. The Confederates were wasting their strength in every assault. Their loss was approximately ten to one compared with ours. Any attempt on their part to renew the attack would have resulted in certain defeat just as all the attacks had resulted. Indeed, their first attack was their best chance for success. After that there was no chance for them to win.

It may be idle to speculate as to what might have been done the next morning. Kimball's division on our extreme right repulsed the attack on them, but this had been feeble. Wood's division on the north bank of the river had not fired a shot. Suppose, that at daybreak Wilson had made a vigorous attack on our extreme left with his cavalry. This would have diverted Hood's attention in that direction and perhaps could have drawn off some of the force to repel the movement. Suppose in the meantime Wood had taken his division over to our extreme right and joined Kimball. Those fresh troops could have begun a folding up process. At the fitting time the center, which had repelled every attack, could have advanced and several thousand men would have been captured. Even then it is possible that the victory would not have been so complete as at Nashville two weeks later. Cox was right in taking the position that it was not necessary to retreat. Hood was not in condition to repeat much of an attack the next morning. With 1,750 of his brave men lying dead before our works, several thousand badly wounded, and twelve of his generals killed, wounded, or captured, the morale of the army was reduced to such an extent that little fight was left in the remnant. Such a counter attack would have resulted in a decisive victory, but the fruits of the victory would have been less than that gained in the fight later when the army was larger and better equipped.

SCHOFIELD'S ACCOUNT OF FRANKLIN.

Since Franklin was the one fight in which Schofield had unusual responsibility as a commander, it is quite natural that he should express himself quite fully on the points in controversy. Schofield cannot take rank with Grant and Sherman as a military man, and his book, "Forty Years in the Army," falls far below the Memoirs of those two great generals. The book is devoted too largely to self-glorification and disparaging other military men. He makes Sherman a great general, but he often criticises him in many ways. At times he praises Thomas highly and speaks of the deep affection that the army of the Cumberland had for their commander, but denies that he deserves credit for the Franklin victory. He also belittles the work of Thomas at Nashville. He thinks the distribution of the forces in the Atlanta campaign was unwise, his part of the command being too small and that of Thomas too large and unwieldy. He carries his criticism into the details of the campaign. In that campaign he took pride in the fact that he and Hood were classmates at West Point and he knew the characteristics of his opponent so thoroughly that he could anticipate his movements. The fact is, however, that Hood outgeneraled him at Columbia, and at Spring Hill the army would have suffered a great disaster had it not been for the masterly work of Stanley and his one division. At Franklin, Hood's army had been in view for more than three hours and were advancing from time to time, and yet Schofield would not believe that the Confederates were intending to make an assault until the rattle of musketry was heard a few hundred yards away. He was so taken by surprise that he left the house where he had made his headquarters in great haste, even forgetting his overcoat and important dispatches from Thomas. He did not then gallop toward the battle line, as did Stanley, who was stopping at the same house, but sought the other side of the river where he could see every part of the army. Important papers would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, had not the lady of the home hidden them. In after years Schofield gave instruction at West Point and he held up as a model the retreat of the army from Columbia. His book is an attempt to justify his own deeds and to place the blame for mistakes upon others.

In his official report of the battle, made soon after the fight was over, he comemnded Wagner highly for the skill with which he had handled his command. Later, he must have felt that military men would naturally wonder why two isolated brigades had been left out in front in such a manner as

to endanger the main line since it could not fire in case the advanced line had to retire. He says in his volume, page 177: "Much idle controversy was indulged in among officers of the Fourth corps and others in respect to the action of those two brigades. The only proper way to settle such a question was by a court-martial. As the corps passed from my command the morning, and had been under my orders only a few days, I have never made any effort to fix, even in my own mind, the responsibility for the blunder". He did not order an investigation at all and no one was ever court-martialed for any blunder. Had this been done in a thorough manner, it doubtless would have reached some in high command.

Schofield gives this account of the battle at the critical moment when he had reached a point on the north side of the river. He says:

"There I witnessed the grandest display possible in war. Every battalion and battery of the Union army in line was distinctly seen. The corps of the Confederate army which were advancing or forming for the attack could also be seen, though less clearly on account of the greater distance, while the Confederate cavalry could be dimly discerned moving to the fords of the river above Franklin. Only a momentary view was permitted of this scene of indescribable grandeur when it was changed to one of most tragic interest and anxiety. The guns of the redoubt on the parapet of which I stood with two or three staff officers had fired only a few shots over the heads of our troops at the advancing enemy when his heavy line overwhelmed Wagner's two brigades and rapidly followed their fragments in a confused mass over our light entrenchments. The charging ranks of the enemy, the fragments of our broken troops, and the double ranks of our first line of defense, coming back from the trenches together, produced a momentary impression of an overthrown mass of the enemy passing over our parapets."

SCHOFIELD'S PERSONALITY NOT A FACTOR.

Yet Schofield did not see the movements of the enemy from that parapet, because he did not reach the fort until the enemy had struck our line. He issued no order that affected the progress of the battle in the smallest degree. Had he gone on to Nashville, instead of stopping at the fort, the battle would have terminated in exactly the manner it did end. His personality was no more a factor in the actual fighting than was that of Thomas twenty miles away. A few pages farther on in his book, in which he said he had never even tried to fix the responsibility for the blunder, he makes a statement exactly the opposite of this. After referring to Wagner and his two brigade commanders, he adds:

"Those three commanders ought to have been tried by court-martial and, if found guilty, shot or cashiered, for sacrificing their own men and endangering the army."

This strong language in which Schofield suggests that Lane and Conrad, as brigade commanders, and Wagner should have been tried by court-martial and shot, if found guilty, occurs in the same chapter in which he states so strongly that he had never in his own mind made any effort to fix the responsibility for the blunder. The two statements are only five pages apart. Lane and Conrad, as brigade commanders, are not to blame, as they were under Wagner. Wagner was under Cox and Schofield and he had a written order to keep his troops out in front till dark and then take them across the river. Of course this was done with the supposition that Hood would not make an assault. Schofield was not convinced that such an attack would be made until he heard the rattle of musketry. He says in his volume (page 228) :

"The Fourth corps was under my own eye nearly all the time, and sometimes in emergencies I even gave orders directly to subordinate commanders without the formality of sending them through the corps commander."

Here was an emergency of the highest order. The enemy had been in full view for hours. They were advancing. Why did not he as commander-in-chief order Wagner back? He saw no reason for it. He believed there would be no assault. The blunder was his or Cox's. Both were in a measure responsible. Hood blamed his failure at Spring Hill upon his subordinates. Both Cox and Schofield contend that Hood was to blame as he was near enough to issue orders to brigade commanders if necessary. These two generals were not willing to have the same rule applied to them at Franklin. It was easier to try to clear themselves by putting the blame on subordinates.

CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS.

Schofield's language is strangely contradictory. In his official report he commends Wagner for his skill in handling his division. After brave General Wagner is in his grave, Schofield declares he has no opinion as to who was responsible for the blunder and later suggests that Wagner should have been court-martialed and possibly shot. The language does not sound like a high-minded soldier willing to do justice to a subordinate. To the ordinary reader it sounds too much like a subterfuge to hide his own neglect of duty. Others have sought to belittle Wagner by circulating a base slander. It has been asserted that Wagner was court-martialed and dismissed from the army. Such is not the case. He was never court-martialed at all. There was never a military inquiry into his conduct at Franklin. He was relieved from serving

with the army of the Cumberland at his own request. Later he was assigned to a command in Missouri and served to the close of the war, and was then honorably discharged or mustered out of the service. Schofield adds:

"I believe little disputes always arise out of honorable rivalry which exists between bodies of troops acting together in a great battle. Franklin was no exception to that general rule. For the purpose of pouring oil on the 'troubled waters' after Franklin, I said that in my opinion there was glory enough won in that battle to satisfy the reasonable ambition of everybody who was on the field and of some who were not there, but who were at first given 'the lion's share; but if the disputants were not satisfied with that, they might take whatever share of credit was supposed to be due me and divide it among themselves."

This language by itself would seem to imply that Schofield was wholly indifferent as to whom the credit was given, but the whole spirit of the discussion on his part shows that he claims the credit. His reference to some who were not there is a sly thrust at Thomas at Nashville. In another place he says Thomas had no right to claim the glory of the Franklin victory. After the battle began, Schofield gave no command or order that in any way influenced the line of battle. The work of the individual soldier and the subordinate officers were the determining factors in repelling the fierce assaults of the enemy. I can bear testimony that in the ranks, at least, the spirit of rivalry of which Schofield speaks was not felt at all. I never heard a remark dropped to the effect that there was any jealousy between the parts of the army that constituted the command. The Twenty-third corps and the Fourth corps each realized that it needed the other and each did the part assigned to it. The very first intimation that there had been any dispute as to authority was found in Cox's book nearly twenty years after the fight. Schofield also carries the impression that Wagner's heavy loss was out in front. This error has already been answered. In the hurried rush back to the works by both armies there was practically no shooting and the loss was trivial.

NASHVILLE THE SEQUEL OF FRANKLIN.

Students of military movements believe that Sherman did not make the wisest distribution of his forces in the two campaigns, his own through Georgia and that of Thomas in Tennessee. Two of the smallest corps of the army were assigned to Thomas and one of these had but two divisions. Thomas asked for his old corps, the Fourteenth, but Sherman would not grant it. Indeed, Sherman's first thought was to leave but one corps, the Fourth, in the rear. Some of the caval-

ry was dismounted in order that Sherman's cavalry might be equipped for the campaign. Of course there were garrisons at Chattanooga and at other points that could be assembled for defense, but such detachments hardly measure up to an organized compact army, tho they may not be inferior to the other troops in valor and personal efficiency. Again it was a question whether such strategic places as Chattanooga should be abandoned to the enemy. None of these forces joined Schofield's command until Nashville was reached. Grant and Sherman both seemed to imply in their orders that Thomas should be ready to oppose Hood at the Tennessee River. When Hood actually began his march forward after equipping his army, the Fourth at Pulaski was the only infantry to oppose him. After this corps fell back to Columbia, it was joined by the Twenty-third corps. The particular force that was expected to give valuable aid was a part of the Sixteenth corps in Missouri under command of General A. J. Smith. This command was ordered to report to Thomas the first of November. The dispatches between Thomas and Schofield show that the force was expected to reach Columbia so as to make a stand at that point. Then it was expected to join Schofield at Spring Hill or Franklin, but this was not possible. It had to be transported on small boats that could navigate the Cumberland. Sherman seems to have thought that it could be assembled in Tennessee in ten days, but as a matter of fact it took thirty days and it did not reach Nashville till after the battle of Franklin. Smith was a good commander and he no doubt rushed matters as fast as he could. So far as is known no one blamed Smith for the delay.

The two corps of infantry and the cavalry that had fought at Franklin reached the outskirts of Nashville on December 1. The men were exhausted and hungry. Schofield says that he slept till late the next day. The men who fought in the ranks were not less in need of rest. Men dropped down on the ground and slept for the most of twenty-four hours whether they had blankets or not. A. J. Smith had disembarked the Sixteenth corps and his command was placed in the line of defense. Steedman had brought from Chattanooga his force of 5,000 men, consisting of a few regiments that had been doing garrison duty there, a few regiments of colored troops, and detachments of several corps that had not been able to join their commands when Sherman started for the sea. Two things were imperative: to prepare against an attack by Hood and to mold these forces into a compact army able to take the offensive as soon as possible. Hood had attacked with such vigor at Franklin and had followed so closely in the

rear that it was thought likely that he might make an assault at Nashville before the forces could be prepared for proper defense. Works were constructed hurriedly with the feeling that they would soon be needed. These works were much more formidable than those at Franklin. Thomas wanted to be ready for the offensive and he was putting forth every effort to that end. Many citizens were armed for defense. Wilson was getting his cavalry in shape. Most of the horses had to be shod. Many of the men had been dismounted so that Kilpatrick's army might be equipped for Sherman's army. Orders came from Washington to take horses wherever they could be found. Horses were taken even from showmen.

GRANT'S IMPATIENCE.

There was much uneasiness in Washington, especially with Grant, on account of a few days' delay. Grant was one of the greatest generals and meant to be fair to his subordinates, but he failed to understand the situation at Nashville. From May till December he had been hammering away at Richmond and Petersburg and the nation did not grow especially impatient. He had proposed to fight it on that line if it took all summer. It took all summer, fall and winter. The people were ready to believe that he was doing all that could be reasonably expected. This will be the verdict of history. Yet Grant was unwilling for Thomas to wait even five days before taking the offensive. He expected him to attack at once and ordered him to do so. Grant was too far away to understand the situation at Nashville. Thomas was not delaying unreasonably. He was getting his army in shape to strike a blow that would paralyze the one formidable army in the West. He was mounting his cavalry in order that that branch of the service might be an important factor in the coming conflict. When Thomas got ready to strike the blow, there came one of the worst storms known in that region in years. The whole surface of the earth was covered with a glare of ice. It was impossible for an army to move to advantage. Indeed it was very difficult for the pickets to reach their posts. It was necessary for them to pick their way along the gulleys near the highways. On December 9th Grant sent a telegram to Halleck to give orders to Thomas to turn over the command to Schofield. Such an order was made out, but there was a hesitancy about sending it. Halleck and possibly Stanton seemed to question the wisdom of such an order and the former sent this message to Grant: "If you still want these orders telegraphed to Nashville, they will be forwarded." Grant then suspended the order removing Thomas. When a positive

order was sent to Thomas to attack regardless of the weather, he called his corps commanders together for consultation and they unanimously agreed that it was unadvisable to take such a step while the ice covered the ground.

In such a council the younger man speaks first. Wilson was the youngest and he says he did speak first, followed by Wood, Steedman, and Smith. Wilson says Schofield sat silent and thus gave his assent to what the others had said. Schofield's account differs from this. He says that he himself was the first to speak and said: "General Thomas, I will sustain you in your determination not to fight until you are fully ready." Wilson adds:

"On the testimony of all who were present it is certain that Schofield's advice, whatever it was, must have been given in private. The fact is, that upon the most notable occasion he sat silent and by that means alone, if at all, he concurred in the judgment of those present that Thomas' course first and last was fully justified by the circumstances and conditions which confronted him. It was doubtless this silence that gave rise to the suspicions on the part of Steedman and possibly of Thomas himself, that Schofield was already in touch with Grant and the War Department."

Whether this was true cannot be determined by official records. Certainly less than two weeks later after the Battle of Nashville he did write to Grant, asking that his corps, no doubt he preferred to call it department, be transferred to the East and he did this without the knowledge of Thomas, his commander-in-chief.

General Wilson was on intimate terms with Grant, Sherman, and Thomas, and had the confidence of all of them. Touching the attempt to hasten Thomas into action before he was prepared, Wilson expressed himself in most emphatic language:

"Under the circumstances, which were well known to the entire army, it was hard for Thomas, who was conceded to be a better technical soldier and organizer than either Grant or Sherman, to understand why he should be censured and lectured by either of them. He knew my intimacy with Grant and his staff and evidently had confidence in my judgment and therefore contented himself with the final declaration that the authorities might relieve him from command and put some one else in his place, in which case he would do all in his power to help him out, but in no case would he fight against his own judgment, or till local conditions should become more favorable."

LOGAN ORDERED TO SUCCEED THOMAS.

Thomas did not learn till years afterwards that Schofield had been designated as his successor. Tho Grant recalled his order for Schofield to succeed Thomas, he took two steps that really reflected on Thomas' ability as an independent com-

inander. He ordered General John A. Logan to go to Nashville and assume command, as it was deemed essential that an attack be made at once regardless of whether men could advance over the ice-covered ground. At one of the conferences Wilson expressed his opinion that with such works as Hood had he could repel an attacking party with brickbats. Logan got as far as Louisville, but turned back when he heard of Thomas' advance. Grant himself started for Nashville, but turned back for the same reason.

Had Logan arrived at Nashville, there would have been a strange military situation so far as the question of rank was concerned. Schofield had expressed his contempt for volunteer officers who had had no military training in schools. He said that Wagner's conduct at Franklin, or failure as he deemed it, was "one of the strongest possible illustrations of the necessity of the higher military education and of the education, which fortunately for the country and the army, is rarely learned by experience, but must be acquired by laborious study of the rules and principles laid down by standard authors as derived from the teachings of the great masters of the art of war in all ages." In other words, he must have a West Point training or the instruction from some other military school. Schofield himself is an illustration of how a man may be a West Point graduate and still leave a portion of his force in front of the regular line of defense contrary to one of the most important military principles.

It has generally been understood that, had Logan arrived he would have taken command of the entire force. Just what the status of Thomas would have been is uncertain. Perhaps he would have been permitted to command the portion of the Army of the Cumberland with which he had been so long connected. Perhaps all his authority might have been taken away. The army that Logan would have commanded came from three departments—a part of the Sixteenth corps from the Army of the Tennessee under A. J. Smith; the Army of Ohio, consisting of two divisions of the Twenty-third corps under Schofield; the Fourth corps from the Army of the Cumberland under Stanley. These corps commanders in the volunteer service all ranked as major generals, but they were also West Point graduates and held lower ranks in the regular army. What was the status of Logan? He was an officer in the volunteer service and held no commission in the regular army. Moreover he was simply a corps commander. Upon the death of McPherson, July 22, 1864, as senior corps commander he assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee and guided the army to victory. He held this position for only a short

time and then resumed his place in command of a corps. The statement of facts in no way reflects upon Logan as a commander. He was one of the best volunteer officers, the most distinguished of such officers. Doubtless the other officers, including Thomas, would have obeyed without a complaint, but there doubtless would have been protest as to the action after the battle was over. Logan was a fine commander and held the confidence of the army as a fighter in a greater degree than did Schofield. Under Logan's leadership or that of any other of the corps commanders a victory would have been won, because Thomas had made thorough preparation for the overthrow of the enemy. In the end the results justified Thomas' delay. He knew the situation and he knew what he was doing, but the Nashville situation was not understood at City Point and Washington.

As late as 1884 Logan seems to have addressed a letter to Grant on the subject as to who would have commanded the army. Grant's reply sounds a little strange. He says:

"In regard to the order for you to go to Louisville and Nashville for the purpose of relieving General Thomas, I never thought of the question of who should command the combined armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio. . . . No doubt, if the order had been carried out, the question would have arisen as to who was entitled to the combined command, provided General Schofield was senior in rank to you, which I do not know that he was. I know his confirmation as a major general took place long after yours, but I did not know the date of his commission".

Grant's mind was so absorbed with business cares when he wrote the letter that he had forgotten the ruling in 1864. Stanley outranked Schofield in date of commission, but the War Department decided that Schofield actually outranked Stanley because he was department commander. On the ruling, of course, Schofield outranked all the other generals there excepting Thomas. His rank was higher than Logan's for the same reason. Grant's letter is a little hard to understand. Why was Logan ordered to Nashville if he were not to assume command?

TERRIBLE DAYS AT NASHVILLE.

Those days at Nashville were terrible for those in the ranks. We had little protection from the cold. Not all the men were supplied with blankets. Fuel was scarce and could be used for cooking only. There were no big fires by which we could warm ourselves. No doubt our foes out in front were suffering worse than we. We were astonished in those days to have orders to be ready to move at daybreak the next day. We knew that no army could possibly carry on a successful operation under the circumstances. I think the order

was repeated each day. We drew the conclusion that we must move as soon as the weather permitted. On the night of December 14th the weather moderated and the thaw set in. Even before it was fully light the army began to move out toward the enemy. Orders had been given to leave a strong skirmish line in the works. Our regiment was very small and it was selected from our brigade for that purpose. So our particular command saw the first day's fight from a distance. The movement was successful and Hood was driven some distance and compelled to shorten his lines considerably.

On the second day the plan of battle was almost a duplicate of the Battle of Missionary Ridge the year before. Steedman with his provisional corps and Wood with the Fourth corps were to press Hood's right strong enough to make him send reinforcement in that direction. Smith, with the Sixteenth corps, and Schofield with the Twenty-third corps were to hold themselves in readiness to advance as the case demanded. Wilson was to throw his cavalry around Hood's left and get into his rear if possible. This was faithfully carried out. Our regiment started before daylight and joined the brigade already in line of battle for the advance. We lay about a half mile from the Confederate works for a short time and the enemy shelled us vigorously. Our batteries also opened fire and silenced those of the enemy. Then we went forward double quick and got within a few rods of the works. So far as we could tell we were not supported either on the right or left. We were exposed to a direct fire in front and also a flank fire on the right. The result was that the attack was halted and we stopped and rolled together a few logs for protection. Our line was established from two to three hundred yards from the Confederate works. Steedman made a similar attack on the left. We could not see this on account of an elevation. I have always thought that the whole line might have been broken, had there been a general charge all along the line. This was evidently not according to the plan and the results would probably not have been so great as they proved to be in the end. In the meanwhile Wilson was pushing his command around the left of the enemy. He actually succeeded in doing this.

HOOD'S DESPERATE DISPATCH.

A dispatch from Hood to Chambers was captured, indicating that Wilson was making things desperate in the enemy's left. It said: "For God's sake drive the Yankee cavalry from our left and rear or all is lost." All this time the infantry on our right was inactive waiting for orders to advance. At

last, growing impatient, Wilson galloped around the enemy's left flank and met Schofield and Thomas standing together. When Wilson explained the situation the order was given to advance. Then the assault was general. Our division held a position in advance of the most of the line. When Smith's corps got about even with our line, we went forward in the assault. It is said that aids galloped in our direction to order us to advance with the rest of the line. They never reached us as we went forward as the proper thing to do. The resistance was feeble indeed. The Confederate line broke and most of the artillery was captured. There was one battery in the rear in reserve we found out and it sent many solid shots into our line. These smashed the limbs from the trees and made it unpleasant for us, but the casualties were few. The enemy probably had no shells with this battery. There is no question but that every part of the line did its duty. If some waited, this was a part of the plan to gain the largest results. No part of the army did better work than did Wilson's. His men dismounted and fought on foot. When the whole Confederate line broke in confusion, his men had to reach their horses and then they started in hot pursuit, as did the infantry. They did not take time to take account of cannon captured or prisoners. These were left to the infantry. Naturally, there has been some dispute as to whether the honor belongs to the infantry or cavalry. This did not prevent a vigorous pursuit until after dark. Some 4,500 were actually taken in the battle and a good many more were captured in the pursuit. Most of Hood's artillery was also taken.

A COMPLETE VICTORY.

There was no more complete victory in the war. Hood's army was no longer a factor in the conflict. The Middle-west was freed from any formidable foe. The victory made Sherman's brilliant exploit a possibility. The outcome of the fight and the campaign justified in the most remarkable manner Thomas' apparent delay at Nashville while he was making the necessary preparation to strike the decisive blow that actually hastened the downfall of the Confederacy.

Congratulatory dispatches came to Thomas in great numbers. Such dispatches came from Lincoln, Grant, and Stanton. Congress passed a joint resolution thanking Thomas, his officers, and soldiers under his command. Later, in making a report of the Movements of the Armies, Grant said of Thomas at Nashville:

"His final defeat of Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment."

Sherman complimented Thomas in a similar manner. Thomas was made major general in the regular army and Secretary Stanton made the announcement in the following dispatch;

"With great pleasure I inform you that for your skill, courage and conduct in the recent brilliant military operations under your command, the President has directed your nomination to be sent to the senate as a major general in the United States Army to fill the only vacancy in that grade. No official duty has been performed by me with more satisfaction, and no commander has more justly earned promotion by devoted, disinterested and invaluable service to his country."

At last the hero of many battles was given the rank that he had actually earned at Chickamauga.

GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.

General Thomas was a native of Virginia and was born in 1816. His early education was received at the Southhampton Academy near his home. He entered West Point in 1836 and graduated in 1840, being the twelfth in his class, W. T. Sherman being the sixth. He served for a time in Florida, and in the Mexican war he won distinction for gallant services and was made brevet major. His admirers in Virginia presented him with a handsome sword. He was made military instructor at West Point and still later he served in the south-west and in California. In 1855 congress added four new regiments to the army, and the Second cavalry was noted for the long list of officers that became famous in the war soon to follow. Not a few have thought that Secretary of War Jefferson Davis appointed these officers in anticipation of war. Many of them were from the South and he seems to have had an eye on the future. Albert Sidney Johnson was made colonel, Robert E. Lee lieutenant colonel, W. J. Horace senior major, and George H. Thomas junior major. The regiment furnished seventeen generals for the war and twelve of them entered the Confederate service. His regiment saw service in Texas and for three years he commanded it. When the war broke out and many of his brother officers resigned and joined the Confederacy, Thomas adhered to the Union and gave it all his influence. Upon the resignation of Robert E. Lee, Thomas became colonel of the famous regiment. He was made a brigadier general and sent to Kentucky. Here, with an independent command, he won the battle of "Mill Springs," really the first important victory in the west. This called forth the commendation of General Buell and President Lincoln. From that time forward Thomas was closely identified with

the army of the Middle West. At Stone River he revealed the qualities of the true soldier.

At Chickamauga when the army was in reality defeated Thomas with his command saved the day and became known as the Rock of Chickamauga. Rosecrans was relieved from command and Thomas became commander of the Army of the Cumberland. At Missionary Ridge he was no less distinguished. A part of his command assisted Sherman on the extreme left while his own force held the center and the extreme right. The assault on the main part of Missionary Ridge by Thomas' forces was one of the most spectacular charges of the war and later, when Grant was made lieutenant general and became commander-in-chief of all the forces, he assumed that his place was in the East with Meade's army. At once the question arose as to who should succeed him in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. To many of us in the Middle West Thomas seemed to be the logical man. He was a more conspicuous commander and had been longer in the public eye. Sherman and Thomas had been successful corps commanders. Both had been in command of departments a short time. Sherman had been more closely associated with Grant and he was selected for the command. No mistake was made. He was equal to the task. Many of us think that Thomas would have done as well, but it is idle to speculate on such a subject. Thomas accepted the subordinate place without a murmur and no one was a great factor in the complete victory won at the time. could possibly have been more loyal to his superior. The correspondence of the period during the Atlanta campaign shows that Sherman relied on Thomas more than upon any other subordinate.

THOMAS ORDERED TO NASHVILLE.

When Atlanta was taken, Thomas said to Sherman: "You have no more need of me; let me take my little command and go eastward to the sea." He could have reached the rear of Lee's army before the winter. Possibly the war might have closed a few months earlier had Thomas been allowed to carry out his plan. Sherman replied that he could not take that responsibility without consulting Grant. He heard nothing more of the matter and soon was ordered back to Nashville to meet Hood. He especially wanted the Fourteenth corps with which he had been so long associated, but his request in that particular was not granted. With the smaller force he won the great victory that hastened the downfall of the Confederacy. He believed that obedience was the first duty of the soldier

and he cheerfully obeyed the commands of his superiors in authority.

After Hood's army had been defeated and scattered, the victorious army of Thomas disintegrated as rapidly as it had been assembled. At the request of Schofield, without any consultation with the commander-in-chief the Twenty-third corps was transferred to the Atlantic coast. The Sixteenth corps was transferred farther south and helped in the capture of Mobile. Wilson with his efficient corps of cavalry pushed into the interior of the South and captured many important towns, the movements resulting in the capture of Jefferson Davis. The Fourth followed Hood out of the state of Tennessee and for a short time got a breathing spell in Huntsville, Alabama. Later it was hurried up to East Tennessee near the North Carolina border. It assisted in repairing the railway in that region and was in readiness to march through to Lynchburg. Whether the idea was to appear in the rear of Richmond or to intercept Lee, in case he evacuated his stronghold, is not known. The surrender of Lee stopped all movements in that direction and soon the Fourth corps was sent back to Nashville.

GRAND REVIEW IN WASHINGTON.

The grand review at Washington was a preliminary step in mustering out the two great armies assembled at the capitol and the men of the Fourth corps were filled with the highest hopes of soon reaching their homes with the two great eastern armies. A review took place at Nashville which has not been recorded by many historians. Thomas saw fit to hold a review of the one corps that had served under him for a goodly time. The Fourteenth corps and the Twentieth corps of the Army of the Cumberland had gone through with Sherman and of course they were in the grand review at Washington. The old warrior was never to see the Army of the Cumberland together again. On the outskirts of the city a reviewing stand was erected and some of the notables of Nashville were on it. The number was not great. The central figure was General George H. Thomas, the personification of the real soldier and the true man. The fifty-four regiments that constituted the corps passed in review and reverently and affectionately saluted the old hero as they reached the reviewing stand. The regiments were all small, some of them mere fragments with scarcely a hundred men. The four years of conflict had done its work in thinning the ranks. The great commander on that day looked upon this organization for the last time. Thousands of soldiers, including the writer, never looked upon that strong and kindly face again. Some of those regiments

were three-year men and they were soon sent home rejoicing. The most of the corps soon found out that instead of being mustered out and going home we were to go to the border of Mexico to encourage the French to leave our neighbor in the south.

ACTION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF TENNESSEE.

The legislature of Tennessee did three things to express its appreciation of General Thomas' service. It passed a resolution making him a citizen of the state. It caused a gold medal to be struck and this was presented to the general on the second anniversary of the battle of Nashville by Governor Brownlow. In his acceptance speech Thomas referred to the fact that it was then thirty years since he had received his diploma at the Military Academy and his first commission in the army, and then added:

"On receiving that commission I took an oath to sustain the Constitution of the United States and the Government and to obey all officers of the Government placed over me. I have faithfully endeavored to keep that oath. I did not regard it so much an oath, as a solemn pledge on my part to return to the Government some little service for the great benefit I had received in obtaining my education at the Academy."

The legislature also provided for a life-size portrait of Thomas to be placed in the capitol. This was carried out and it reflected the real spirit of the legislature at the time. Later another legislature proposed to sell the picture. Whether this proposal was done in all seriousness or for political effect can hardly be determined. It caused the old soldier some annoyance and his friends were about to purchase it. The picture still hangs in the capitol and it is a fine likeness of the famous commander of the Army of the Cumberland.

Schofield feels compelled to speak favorably of Thomas' manly qualities, but he loses no opportunity to disparage his military qualities. He says:

"No one, I am sure, of his comrades in arms desires to detract from the great fame which is justly his due; for, according to the best judgment of mankind, moral qualities, more than intellectual, are the foundation of a great and enduring fame. It was 'Old Pap' Thomas, not General Thomas, who was beloved by the Army of the Cumberland; and it is the honest, conscientious patriot, the firm unflinching old soldier, not the general, whose name will be most respected in history."

This is meant as a compliment, a compliment that he could not well withhold, but it is expressed in a manner to belittle his military power which was really very high. Schofield thinks the glory of the victory at Franklin belonged to him, not to Thomas. Yet Schofield blundered in not thinking till

the last moment that Hood would make the assault. He blundered in leaving those two brigades out in front. After the battle began he gave no vital command that affected the line of battle until he gave the command to retreat against Cox's protest.

THOMAS IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD.

Following the war Thomas did a good work in the reconstruction period and revealed great wisdom in handling delicate questions. When it was once proposed to assign him a place beneath his rank, he became indignant and sent a friend to the president to make a protest. His orders were:

"I wish you to take the first train for Washington and tell President Johnson that during the war I permitted the national authorities to do what they pleased with me; they put juniors over me and I served under them; the life of the Nation was at stake and it was not then proper to press questions of rank, but now that the war is over and the Nation saved, I demand a command suited to my rank or I do not want any."

The request was heeded and Thomas was assigned to the Military Division of the Mississippi. He had some delicate questions to settle and he was equal to the emergency. When an Episcopal Bishop advised the ministers under him to omit the prayer for the president, Thomas ordered the churches closed until proper respect should be shown to the chief magistrate. Later Thomas was transferred to the Pacific coast.

In 1868, when President Johnson was having friction with the War Department and many others near him, he appointed Thomas brevet lieutenant-general and general and sent the appointment to the senate for confirmation. As soon as Thomas saw this announcement in the paper, he sent a dispatch to Hon. B. F. Wade, president of the senate, asking that the nomination be not confirmed. He also sent a dispatch to the president asking him to recall the recommendation. He closed the communication with these words:

"I have done no service since the war to deserve so high a compliment and it is now too late to be regarded as a compliment, if conferred for services during the war.

It was generally believed that had the senate confirmed the nomination, President Johnson would have placed Thomas at the head of the army in place of Grant. Thomas was not the man to try to crowd another out of his place. Several incidents of the period show this plainly. Perhaps these dispatches may not reveal the real motive in declining the honor, but certain it is that this is the only instance in the history of our country in which an officer has ever declined so high honors. In 1868 he was urged to allow his name to appear as a candi-

date for the presidency, but he promptly declined. The same idea was urged later that he allow his name to appear in 1872, but he declined again to have his name appear. While declaring his willingness to perform all military duties that his country might demand of him, he added; "All civic honors I shall continue to decline."

DEATH AND MEMORIAL SERVICE.

The brave old hero was not allowed to enjoy his well earned honors after the war closed. Some one as late as March, 1870, wrote an article for the New York Tribune criticising him for the manner of conducting the Nashville battle. He believed the article was at least inspired by a subordinate whose friendship he questioned. He felt that the article deserved an answer and he was preparing a reply on the 28th of March, 1870, when he was stricken with apoplexy, dying in a short time. In his death the nation felt that it had lost one of its ablest and truest sons. The memorial services held in Washington were second only to those accorded to presidents of the nation. He was laid to rest at Troy, New York, President Grant and many other notable being in attendance. The pallbearers were Generals Meade, Schofield, Hooker, Rosecrans, Hazen, Granger, Newton, and McCay. Thus the nation sought to do honor to the memory of one of her really great men.

The four years of war brought to the front a few men who were especially noted for their services. Among these were Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Meade, and Sheridan. It is a very high honor to have a name in such a list and Thomas belongs there. Yet there were others who in merit ranked close to these and would have proved themselves equal to higher tasks, had they been called upon to meet them. There were thousands of subalterns and men in the ranks competent to lead commands had circumstances placed upon them these responsibilities. It is the glory of the American army and American citizenship that strong men in obscure places meet their duties aright and thus give strength to the nation as a whole. In subordinate places and in high positions Thomas always showed his greatness.

W. W. GIST.

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF LIBRARY, ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

It is a matter of astonishment that the Department of Archives and History of the State of Tennessee was established as recently as the year 1904. Still more astonishing is the fact that apparently this department was created without act or resolution of the Legislature.

For some time prior to 1904 the late Robert T. Quarles had been making strong efforts with members of the General Assembly for the establishment of a Department of Archives and History and encountered chilling indifference on the part of many members, yet obtained a little cooperation on the part of a few.

ROBERT T. QUARLES FIRST ARCHIVIST

In an affidavit made by Mr. Quarles on Sept 18, 1906, in connection with the papers discovered by him pertaining to the boundary line between Tennessee and North Carolina, he uses the following language:

"The Department of Archives and History was established by the Legislature of Tennessee in 1904, and I was soon after appointed Archivist of the State of Tennessee."

Mr. Quarles told the writer at the time that he was appointed State Archivist by Gov. McMillin. Doubtless what Mr. Quarles deemed as the establishment of the Department of Archives and History was the fact that the Legislature made appropriations by which the work was carried on. Yet these appropriations were not made in the name of the Department of Archives and History until 1907.

Prior to the establishment of the Department of Archives and History in 1904, the valuable papers, documents and records of Tennessee were in the general charge of the Secretary of State, but in practice, as the departments became congested, large quantities of papers, documents and books, not in current use, were stored in the basement of the Capitol, in a crypt, where damp atmosphere, ashes, oil, grease, rodents and other agencies of destruction caused the injury and partial or total demolition of many priceless historical records. It is also extremely painful to state that many wagon loads of these stores were carted off to the dumping grounds, and many others were sold for waste paper.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN 1901

In 1901 the Legislature awoke to the necessity of providing for the proper preservation of the Archives of the State, as is shown by the adoption of House Joint Resolution No. 60 which reads as follows:

Whereas, For the want of proper space in the various offices in the Capitol building, the archives, books and documents of great value and historical interest have been placed in the basement of the building where they are molding and decaying. And, "Whereas, A large number of said books consists of duplicate sets of the Supreme Court Reports, which could be sold and the money turned into the treasury, and "Whereas, There is sufficient space in the Capitol building for the proper preservation of all the archives of the State, therefore,

Be it resolved by the House of Representatives, Senate concurring, That the House and Senate Committees on Public Grounds and Buildings be directed to investigate and report the proper steps to be taken and the probable cost of preparing proper space for the preservation of the Archives of the State, and what disposition can be made of the duplicate sets of Supreme Court Reports belonging to the State.

Adopted March 13, 1901.

E. B. WILSON,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

NEWTON H. WHITE,
Speaker of the Senate.

Approved March 16, 1901.

BENTON McMILLIN,
Governor.

Nothing was done by this committee and near the end of the session the resolution was reported among those "lying over."

However, in the report of the special committee to investigate the condition of the Capitol, which report was made on March 28, 1901, appears the following recommendation of James H. Yeaman, the architect employed by the committee:

"Twentieth, I recommend that enough of the attic be prepared with floors, walls, ceilings and dormer windows all complete and made a suitable place for a new archives room."

In 1903 Mr. Quarles succeeded so effectually in interesting Gov. McMillin in the condition of the valuable papers stored in a damp part of the basement of the Capitol that the Governor devoted a portion of the appropriations for the repair of the Capitol to the removal of papers to a dry section occupied by the Armory.

This provision appears in the Miscellaneous Appropriation Bill for 1903, as follows:

"For preserving the archives of the State of Tennessee, \$1,200, Provided it shall be expended under the direction of the Governor."

TENNESSEE HISTORICAL SOCIETY COOPERATES

In 1905 the Tennessee Historical Society cooperated in the effort to induce the Legislature to establish a department of Archives. This attempt was virtually a failure although through the endeavors of the Tennessee Historical Society, Hon. Thomas M. Owen and Dr. Dunbar Rowland made strong addresses to the Legislature, as shown by House Joint Resolution No. 3, as follows:

"Whereas, The Hon. Thomas M. Owen and Dunbar Rowland, archivists respectively of Alabama and Mississippi, have been invited by the Tennessee Historical Society to visit Nashville on January 10 and 11; and

"Whereas, The object of this visit is to discuss the best method for the collection and preservation of the public records and State's history; Therefore, be it resolved

"1. That these distinguished gentlemen be invited to address a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives at such an hour as may be fixed by the joint action of the two bodies, on the morning of January 10th:

2. That a joint committee from the Senate and House of Representatives be appointed by the respective chairs to notify these gentlemen of the wishes of the two bodies, and to make such arrangements as to carry out the object of the resolution.

WILL K. ABERNATHY,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

J. I. COX,
Speaker of the Senate.

Approved January 11, 1905.

JAMES N. FRAZIER,
Governor.

This action was supplemented by House Resolution No. 17 which stated:

"Be it resolved by the House of Representatives, That the hour for the address to be delivered by Hon. Thos. M. Owen and Hon. Dunbar Rowland, by invitation of House by Resolution No. 3, be fixed as a special order for Tuesday, January 10, at 11 a. m.

WILL K. ABERNATHY,
Speaker of the House of Representatives."

Nevertheless the Legislature did nothing. It did not during the session even make an appropriation of any kind for the benefit of the Archives of the State.

APPROPRIATION FOR DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

In 1907, however, while the Department of Archives and History was not created, an appropriation was made for the Department of History and Archives.

The General Assembly for the biennium 1907-1908 appropriated \$4,000.00 for the Department of History and Archives, apportioned as follows:

Secretary to be appointed by the Governor, salary not to exceed \$1,500 per annum. Office expenses, per annum, \$500.

In 1907 also a resolution was adopted by the Legislature as follows:

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 15

"Be it resolved by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring, That a committee of three from the House and two from the Senate, be appointed by the respective Speakers thereof to examine the old records and archives of the State, and report as to the condition in which it finds them, and what, if anything, should be done for the preservation and care of same; and ascertain if the Tennessee Historical Society or any individual have collections of relics, etc., they would under the proper conditions be willing to donate to the State.

Adopted January 25, 1907.

JOHN T. CUNNINGHAM, JR.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
E. G. TOLLETT,
Speaker of the Senate.

Approved January 30, 1907.

MALCOLM R. PATTERSON,
Governor."

Report of Committee of 1907

On March 20, 1907 the following report was made by the committee appointed to investigate the State Archives under House Joint Resolution No. 15:

"We, your Joint Committee, appointed by House Joint Resolution No. 15, to examine the office of Archivist of the State and report upon its condition and its needs, beg to say that we have performed that duty, and we find and report that the work so far accomplished has been splendidly performed and that Mr. Quarles, the officer in charge of the Archives, is entitled to the thanks of the people of the entire State, for his great interest and painstaking care in rescuing, classifying and preserving the ancient records and documents of the State of Tennessee. His office apartments, although in the attic of the Capitol, are models of neatness and of record classification, and his department is one of the most interesting of the official departments of the State, and well worthy of a visit from every member of the Legislature, or other visitor at the Capitol.

"We recommend a continuance of the appropriation for this department and think that better quarters or rooms should be provided for this important and most interesting branch of the public service.

"We were also directed by the said resolution to examine and inspect the collections of the Tennessee Historical Society, as well as the curios, relics, etc., of General Gates P. Thruston, and ascertain their probable value, and upon what terms and conditions they could be obtained as the property of the State of Tennessee; and we are glad to be able to report that the Tennessee Historical Society has signified its willingness to present to the State all of its historical documents, ancient relics and other treasures so closely

interwoven with the past history of the State, and worth many thousands of dollars, upon the simple promise and undertaking of the State to provide a suitable place for the preservation and safekeeping of these splendid gifts.

"General Thurston has also geological specimens of the State, as well as curios and Indian antiquities, which are invaluable and can never be duplicated and he generously offers these as a gift to the State upon the same terms and condition, and expresses a desire to contribute, besides, a fixed and permanent sum to be expended annually for their care and preservation; and these generous offers should be accepted with an emphatic expression of thanks to the donors as the State's noble benefactors.

In view of these facts, and of the crowded condition of the Capitol and the evident need for more room to accommodate the several departments of the State, we recommend the purchase by the State, as soon as may be, of a building convenient to the Capitol, to be occupied by the State Archivist with the Archives and the gifts of General Thurston and the Tennessee Historical Society by the Supreme Court of the State, the Court of Civil Appeals, and the office of the State Librarian.

"We understand that the Bishop's residence and grounds, immediately south of the Capitol can be had under an option formerly granted to the State, for the sum of twenty-three thousand, five hundred dollars (\$23,500.00), and we earnestly urge its purchase by the State immediately and for the purposes above set forth.

Respectfully submitted this March 20th, 1907.

T. E. GORDON,
JAMES ARMITAGE,
W. T. GALLOWAY,
J. M. GRAHAM,
F. M. MCRAE."

This report was adopted, but the only portion of it carried into effect was the continuance of the appropriation for the maintenance of the Department of History and Archives.

Four thousand dollars was appropriated for this department by the Legislature for the biennium of 1909-1910 and distributed in the same way as for the biennium of 1907-1908.

For the biennium of 1911-1912 five thousand dollars was appropriated for this department, consisting of the same items as in the two preceding biennia with the addition of \$500 per annum for an assistant clerk.

Mr. R. T. Quarles served as State Archivist until his death, March 5, 1913, and was succeeded by his son Robert T. Quarles, Jr., who served until the appointment of Dr. Gus W. Dyer in 1914.

For the biennium of 1913-1914 the Legislature appropriated for this department \$6,000, distributed as follows:

Secretary, to be appointed by the Governor at a salary not to exceed \$1,500 per annum, \$3,000. Clerk, \$500 per annum, \$1,000.

Office expenses, \$1,000 per annum, \$2,000.

In view of the writer's contention that the Department of Archives and History was never established by Legislative act or resolution, the following newspaper story, which appeared in the Nashville Banner of March 25, 1915, may be of interest:

RESIGNATION OF PROFESSOR DYER ASKED.

Head of Non-existent Department Remains as Custodian Anyhow. Efforts are being made by Gov. Rye to obtain the resignation of Prof. Gus Dyer, who was appointed by Gov. Hooper as keeper of archives. According to an interpretation by Gov. Rye and his advisors, there is no such thing as the State department of Archives, and hence there is no obligation on the legislature to provide for its support.

So far Prof. Dyer has declined to resign from an office which the governor claims is non-existent, one reason being that he is in charge of valuable material belonging to the State, and that no one has been selected to assume the responsibility. Just now the department is engaged in a most important work in connection with the records of the confederacy. The position is also taken that as Gov. Rye does not recognize the position of keeper of archives he need not worry about the resignation of any such 'alleged' official.

"Perhaps an explanation of the solicitude of the administration has been prepared for introduction in the legislature creating a department of archives and history, to be under the supervision of a director. As this is practically the same as keeper of archives, and as Prof. Dyer's appointment was for two years, there might be some doubt as to the right of the legislature to legislate Prof. Dyer out of office in this way, and the appointment to the position would be delayed for a year or more. With so many applicants for office and so few offices, to apportion around, this of course might be a consideration."

Only five days after the appearance of this article the Senate passed the following resolution:

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 54.

(By Mr. Ashcroft.)

"Whereas, What is known and termed in the appropriation Bill published in the Acts of 1913, as the Department of History and Archives, exists only by reason of the provision made in said appropriation Bill, which appropriation expired with the end of the Biennial Period, March 19, 1915; and which said appropriation provided for the appointment of a secretary by the Governor at a salary of \$1,500.00 per annum, and a clerk at \$500.00 per annum, and office expenses of \$1,000.00 per annum; and whereas, said Department, since March 19th, has no legal existence under any law:

Therefore be it resolved, by the Senate, the House concurring, that the Governor be, and he is hereby empowered and directed to forthwith appoint or employ some suitable person to take charge of the records, documents and other property belonging to said Department, preserve and take care of the same, at a salary not exceeding \$50.00 per month until such time as the Legislature may make permanent

provision for the care and preservation of the department above referred to.

Adopted March, 29th, 1915.

ALBERT E. HILL,
Speaker of the Senate.
WM. P. COOPER,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Approved March 30, 1915.

TOM C. RYE,
Governor."

Robt. T. Quarles, Jr. was then again placed in charge of the State archives and served until 1918, when he was succeeded by Willoughby S. Williams.

Parenthetically, it will be noted that the Legislature in its resolution and appropriations invariably uses the expression "Department of History and Archives," whereas, the stationery and signs of this department have always read "Department of Archives and History."

The appropriation for the biennium of 1915-1916, however, was as follows: Clerk to be appointed by the Governor at salary not to exceed \$900.00 per annum—\$1,800.00. Office expenses, per annum \$1,000.00—\$2,000.00.

For the biennium of 1917-1918 the appropriation was as follows: Chief Clerk, to be appointed by the Governor at a salary not to exceed \$1,200.00 per annum—\$2,400.00. Office expenses, \$600.00 per annum—\$1,200.00.

Mr. Williams served until his death in 1919.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHIVES ABOLISHED.

In 1919 the Department of History and Archives was abolished by House Bill No. 319 which reads as follows:

HOUSE BILL NO. 319.

(By Dr. Griffin, Lake County.)

AN ACT to abolish the Department of History and Archives, and transfer all articles, books and papers thereof to the State Library, and require the State Librarian, without additional salary, to look after the same; and authorizing the appointment of a porter by the State Librarian to aid in the additional work imposed by this Act.

SECTION 1. *Be it enacted* by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That the Department of History and Archives be, and the same is hereby abolished, and that all articles, books and papers in charge of said department be, and the same are transferred and made part of the State Library, and it shall be the duty of the State Librarian, without additional salary, to look after and care for all books, papers and articles in said Department of History and Archives.

SECTION 2. *Be it further enacted*, That the State Librarian be authorized to employ, if needed, in caring for and looking after the articles, books and papers belonging to the Department of History and Archives, an extra porter for that purpose, who shall be paid

not more than the sum of sixty dollars per month, on warrant drawn by the Comptroller of the Treasury.

SECTION 3. *Be it further enacted*, That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act be, and the same are hereby repealed, and this Act take effect from and after its passage, the public welfare requiring it.

Passed March 25, 1919.

SETH M. WALKER,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

ANDREW L. TODD,
Speaker of the Senate.

Approved March 29, 1919.

A. H. ROBERTS,
Governor.

Since that time the Department of Archives and History has been a part of the State Library; and under the efficient administration of John Trotwood Moore, has been better taken care of than ever before, and although handicapped by over crowded quarters and insufficient appropriation is daily proving its indispensability and serviceableness.

The appropriation for the State Library for the biennium 1919-1921 was as follows:

Salary of Librarian, who shall serve as Archivist,

\$2,400 per annum \$4,800.00

Salary of two (2) Assistant Librarians, \$1,200 each per annum 4,800.00

For Library expenses to be expended under the direction of the Library Commission, \$1,000

per annum 2,000.00

Archives expenses, \$500 per annum 1,000.00

For the purchase of new books to be expended under the direction of the Library Commission,

\$2,500 per annum 5,000.00

For the biennium 1921-1923 the appropriation for the State Library was:

Salary of Librarian who shall serve as Archivist,

\$2,400 per annum \$4,800.00

Two (2) Assistant Librarians \$1,350 each per annum 5,400.00

For Library expenses to be expended under the direction of the Library Commission \$1,000

per annum 2,000.00

Archives expenses, \$500 per annum 1,000.00

For purchase of new books to be expended under the direction of the Library Commission

\$2,500 per annum 5,000.00

Especial attention is called to the fact that during the past two years only \$500 per year has been appropriated

for the Archives of the State, and the same sum per year has been provided for the Archives during the current biennium. It is earnestly to be hoped that subsequent legislatures will be disposed to deal more liberally with regard to this important department of the State.

THE TENNESSEE STATE LIBRARY.

The Tennessee State Library was created as a separate department of the state by act of the Legislature passed January 20, 1854, and the Secretary of State was constituted, in section two of the act, as ex officio State Librarian. But afterwards the librarians were elected by the Legislature until 1901 when the Governor, the Attorney General and the Chief Justice were, by act of the Legislature, Chapter 52, section, of the Acts of 1901, constituted the State Library Commission, having the state library in their charge and by whom the state librarian is selected.

In the report of Miss Mary Skeffington, the state librarian, covering the biennium of 1903-1904, is published a letter written her by Judge John S. Wilkes, by order of the Supreme Court, in which various recommendations are made, especially recommending the appropriation of more money for the purchase of books. In that report of the librarian, recommendation No. 4 reads as follows:

"That the State Library Commission join in the movement of the Tennessee Historical Society to secure the passage of a bill creating the Department of History and Archives and securing an appropriation for a handsome building, to include the State Library Department of History and the Tennessee Historical Society.

TENNESSEE STATE HISTORICAL COMMITTEE.

Immediately on the assembling of the Legislature of Tennessee, January, 1919, Mr. John Trotwood Moore began to initiate a consideration whereby the history of the soldiery and allied work of Tennessee in the world's war might be gathered together and preserved, and through his instrumentality the following joint resolution was passed:

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 12.

(By Messrs. Houk and Patton.)

Whereas, the conduct of Tennessee men and the heroic courage of her women have gained for Tennessee the proud title of the "Volunteer State"; and

Whereas, the Tennessee soldiers, by their valorous and chivalrous deeds on the battlefields of Europe in the world war, have shed new luster on our State, therefore be it

Resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That the Governor of the State be, and he is hereby authorized and re-

quested to appoint a committee of twenty-five (25) citizens of the State to be known as the Tennessee State Historical Committee, whose duty it shall be to collect, compile, index and arrange all data and information of every kind and character relating to the part that Tennessee has played in the great world war and turn the same over to the State Archivist or the State Librarian for safekeeping for the future historians of the State; and be it further

Resolved. That this committee shall serve without compensation, and that the Governor be requested to direct the sympathetic help of every department of the State government to assist in this undertaking.

Adopted January 23, 1919.

ANDREW L. TODD,
Speaker of the Senate.

SETH M. WALKER,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Approved January 24, 1919.

A. H. ROBERTS,
Governor.

On March 1st, 1919, Mr. Moore was elected by the State Library Commission to the office of State Librarian, and at once succeeded in having legislation enacted whereby the scope and duties of the Tennessee State Historical Committee were very much enlarged, as will be seen from the following resolution passed:

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 76.
(By Messrs. Patton and Houk.)

Whereas, the conduct of Tennessee soldiers and citizens and the heroic conduct of her women have gained for Tennessee the proud title of the "Volunteer State"; and,

Whereas, Tennessee citizens and soldiers by their valorous and chivalrous deeds on the battlefields of Europe in the war now closed, and in all the wars in which Tennessee have been engaged from the foundation of the State, have shed new luster on the name of Tennessee; and

Whereas, the State of Tennessee was the first in which the white man's civilization was planted west of the Alleghany Mountains and the State thereby became the torch bearer of civilization in all the great valley of the Mississippi; and,

Whereas, a full, complete and comprehensive history of Tennessee has not been yet written in past for the reason of a lack of collected material on which to base such history;

Therefore, be it resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That the Tennessee State Historical Committee, which has been appointed by the Governor of the State under authority of Senate Joint Resolution No. 12, shall have the duty imposed upon it to collect, compile, index and arrange all data and information of every kind and character relating to the part that Tennessee has played, not only in the great world war which is now closed, but in all the wars in which citizens or soldiers of Tennessee were engaged; and also all data of every sort and kind which illustrate the life, history, development, resources, progress, personalities, artists, authors, orators, inventors, and statesmen of the State, and all such

data or information on these subjects shall be turned over to the State Librarian for safe-keeping for the future history of the State.

Be it further resolved, That this committee shall serve without compensation and that the Governor be requested to direct the sympathetic help of every department of the State government to assist in this undertaking.

Adopted March 25, 1919.

ANDREW L. TODD,
Speaker of the Senate.

SETH M. WALKER,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Approved March 29, 1919.

A. H. ROBERTS,
Governor.

The Legislature of 1921 added still to the scope and duties of the Historical Committee, and made an appropriation of ten thousand dollars for the ensuing biennium to be spent in furthering its interest, etc. viz:

SENATE BILL NO. 164.

AN ACT to provide for the collection, preservation and publication of material relative to the history of Tennessee, including the military records of its citizens; to define further the powers and duties of the Tennessee Historical Committee and to provide for filling vacancies therein; to provide for marking battlefields and other historic places within the State, and for a historical museum; and to appropriate the sum of ten thousand dollars annually for carrying out the provisions of the Act.

SECTION 1. *Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee,* That it shall be the duty of the State Historical Committee, appointed by the Governor of Tennessee, by authority of Senate Joint Resolution No. 12, Acts of Tennessee, 1919, to collect for permanent preservation in the Archives of Tennessee the individual records of the Tennessee soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines who saw service in the great world war. These records shall be collected on cards, showing the date and place of birth; date of enlistment, branch of service and date of death or when mustered out, of every soldier, sailor, airman and marine, together with all the original letters, maps papers, official documents, medals, mementos and souvenirs possible to be collected and all other papers which will throw historical light on the valiant part enacted by Tennessee in the world war. And these records, maps, medals, original letters, papers, official documents, relics, mementos and souvenirs shall be filed in a suitable file, each county's records separately kept, and all preserved in a fire-proof place in the Archives of the State of Tennessee.

SEC. 2. *Be it further enacted* That all of the records of the State's world war activities, both civil and military, including the Red Cross, medical corps, hospital service, sale of Liberty Bonds, War Savings Stamps and patriotic organizations of all kinds as well as individuals who gave patriotic service at home or abroad, shall be collected by said committee and properly preserved in the Archives of the State.

SEC. 3. *Be it further enacted*, That the State Historical Committee shall collect from the files of old newspapers, court records, church records, private collections and elsewhere, historical data pertaining to the State of Tennessee and the territory included therein

from the earliest times: to have such material properly edited, published by the State printer and distributed under the direction of the committee; to care for the proper marking and preservation of battlefields, houses and other places celebrated in the history of the State; to provide and maintain a historical museum; to diffuse knowledge in reference to the history and resources of Tennessee; to encourage the study of Tennessee history in the schools of the State, and to stimulate and encourage historical investigation and records among the people of the State; to make an annual report of its receipts and its work and its needs to the Governor, to be by him transmitted to the General Assembly.

SEC. 4. *Be it further enacted*, That the Tennessee Historical Committee shall have power to adopt a seal for use and for official business; to adopt rules for its government not inconsistent with this Act; to fix a reasonable price for its publication and to devote the revenue arising from such sales to extending the work of the Committee; to employ an assistant secretary at a salary of not more than one hundred and fifty (\$150.00) dollars per month who shall do the copying, stenographing, collecting and compiling of the historical data collected by the committee; and to employ any additional help may be necessary to collect and preserve the records; to control the expenditures of such funds as may be appropriated for its maintenance: provided that at least one copy of its publications shall be furnished free of charge to any public school library or public library in Tennessee. State officers and members of the General Assembly making application for same through the constituted authorities.

SEC. 5. *Be it further enacted*, That the director of the library, archives and history of the State shall be chairman of the Tennessee Historical Committee and shall maintain an office for the secretary of the committee in the state library or some other place designated by the committee; that in collecting history and visiting historical places for the purpose of collecting historical data thereon or establishing markers at historical points in the State or while otherwise traveling in the interest of this department the actual expenses of the chairman of the committee or the secretary of the committee shall be paid from the fund herein provided in this Act.

SEC. 6. *Be it further enacted*, That in the case of death or resignation of one of the committee the remaining members shall elect his or her successor.

SEC. 7. *Be it further enacted*, That an executive board of ten members of the Historical Committee, appointed yearly by the Chairman shall meet the Chairman at the State Capital at least twice yearly at the call of the Chairman to transact business and receive the report of the secretary, and the entire committee shall meet once yearly for the same purpose. The actual expenses of the executive committee incurred while attending these meetings shall be paid from the fund hereinafter appropriated for the purpose.

SEC. 8. *Be it further enacted*, That any State, county, town or other public official in custody of public documents is hereby authorized and empowered at his discretion to turn over to said committee any official books, documents, records, official papers, newspaper files, printed books or portraits not in current use in his office and said committee shall provide for their permanent preservation. But when so surrendered, copies therefrom shall be made and certified under the seal of the committee upon application of any person, which certificate shall have the force and effect as if made by the officer originally in charge of them and the committee shall charge for such

copies the same fees as said officer is by the law allowed to charge.

SEC. 9. *Be it further enacted*, That for carrying out the purposes and objects of this Act the sum of ten thousand (\$10,000) dollars or so much thereof as shall be needed over and above all the funds derived from the sale of the publications of the committee and all of the fees collected under Section 5 of this Act, is hereby annually appropriated, and upon order of the chairman of the committee the State Comptroller is hereby empowered and directed to draw his warrant for the sum from the State Treasury.

SEC. 10. *Be it further enacted*, That this Act shall take effect after its passage, the public welfare requiring it.

In accordance with the above legislation the Tennessee State Historical Committee has been duly organized, with the following officers and members:

JOHN TROTWOOD MOORE, *Chairman*.
JOHN H. DEWITT, *Secretary*.
A. P. FOSTER, *Assistant Secretary*.
GEN. L. D. TYSON, *Knoxville*.
HON. A. V. GOODPASTURE, *Clarksville*.
R. H. YANCY, *Nashville*.
ROBERT S. FLETCHER, *Jackson*.
S. G. MEISKELL, *Knoxville*.
MISS CLARA COX EPPERSON, *Cookeville*.
COL. LUKE LEA, *Nashville*.
SAMUEL L. KING, *Bristol*.
SENATOR E. E. PATTON, *Knoxville*.
W. E. BEARD, *Nashville*.
MISS LIZZIE BLOOMSTEIN, *Nashville*.
COL. W. J. BACON, *Memphis*.
J. I. FINNEY, *Columbia*.
COL. HARRY S. BERRY, *Hendersonville*.
COL. CAREY H. SPENCE, *Knoxville*.
E. M. BOYD, *Cookeville*.
JOHN H. DEWITT, *Nashville*.
MISS DAISY BARRETT, *Chattanooga*.
W. E. MC ELWEE, *Rockwood*.
MISS ZELLA ARMSTRONG, *Chattanooga*.
HALLUM W. GOODLOE, *Nashville*.
A. P. FOSTER, *Assistant Secretary*.

A YANKEE SCHOOL MASTER'S REMINISCENCES OF TENNESSEE*

In September, 1866, I was invited to undertake the principalship of the high school in the City of Nashville, Tenn. The invitation was at once accepted, and early in that month the duties of that office were assumed. To the young man who had never before been out of New England, nor farther west than the Connecticut River, Tennessee was like a foreign country. Not a person in the City of Nashville had I ever seen, and as a Yankee schoolmaster I felt like a foreigner. The School Board, composed entirely of men of Southern birth and sentiments, had, nevertheless, made up their minds to get for the city schools teachers from any quarter who seemed qualified to make their schools what their judgment told them they should be. So they selected the principals and many of their subordinates without regard to any sectional prejudice. I venture the assertion that no fairer nor more self-sacrificing company of men were ever chosen for like responsibilities.

The state and city were then just beginning to recover from the disasters of a great civil war. All educational affairs were in a state of demoralization. And so the wise men, knowing the needs of the city and welcoming any help that they might be able to get, naturally, with this purpose in mind, turned to the North, from which quarter they could secure those whom they needed. Only a few of the residents of Nashville or, indeed, of any town in Middle or Western Tennessee, had been friendly to the cause of the Union. In the mountainous region of East Tennessee alone could Union men be found in any numbers.

THE BROWNLOW REGIME.

The state was in the iron grasp of the Brownlow regime. No one could vote unless he could show at the polls a certificate signed by a commissioner and supported by the sworn testimony of two well-known Union men stating that the intending voter had never in any manner been disloyal to the Union. That barred out about all the citizens of Nashville. This interesting document was illustrated with a portrait of the iron-clad Governor Brownlow. Nashville was controlled by that excrescence of the departed Northern army known familiarly as "carpet-baggers," and with a few honorable exceptions the name was well applied to those who governed the city, and finally, when the time of overthrow approached, looted the treasury and stole away.

Nashville in 1866 had many things to remind the newcomer that only little more than a year had passed since war had ceased. The forts on the hills to the south and west of the city, hills once covered with a luxuriant forest, but now bared by the needs of contending armies, were still there, and one, Fort Negley, wore still its plating of railroad iron and had even some dismounted cannon. The headquarters of the Army of Tennessee were there, with Gen. Thomas in command, and the temporary barracks still held troops of soldiers.

The stranger, the new principal of the high school, felt more and more the loneliness of his adventure into such new surroundings, as he neared the terminus of the railway from Louisville, but a hearty

*The Oklahoma Historical Society has kindly furnished this clipping from the *St. Louis Republic*, February 28, 1913.—ED.

welcome at the station from others, also strangers, but with a week's acquaintance with the city, engaged in work like his own, dispelled at once the gloom. Room had already been bespoken for him in a house kept by a big-hearted Southern lady, a house for a time during the war the headquarters of Gen. Rousseau of the Union Army. Passing through the yard in the rear of the house and crossing a narrow alley, one could see the gate opening into the backyard of the big house then occupied by Gen. Thomas as his headquarters, and on his first evening in Tennessee he heard the military band in front of the house playing all the familiar patriotic airs, as was the custom every evening for an hour or so, closing with "Yankee Doodle" and "The Star-Spangled Banner." Then the stranger felt at home, nor was he again troubled with the lonely melancholy of the early morning.

A VISIT TO GENERAL THOMAS.

In some way these young Yankees made the acquaintance of one of the aids of the commanding general, and on one of these autumn evenings were invited to enter the headquarters.

This visit was one of many during the year that followed, but that particular evening lingers in my mind as a red-letter evening in those youthful years. Gen. Thomas was in the living room reading when we entered. Seeing strangers, he rose. The lieutenant gave him our names and told him that we were some schoolmasters, college men from New England, who were feeling a bit lonesome, and he had made bold to ask them in. The general came forward and, taking us by the hand, said: "Gentlemen, you are welcome. I know just how you feel. Where are you living?" And when we told him that our house backed up against his, he laughed and said: "Well, now, that is just as it should be. Understand, now, that I want you to make this room your lounging place; you are to feel at home here at any time. My business is in another room and you cannot disturb any of us. Come in by the back gate," this last with a smile. "Here are the New York and Washington papers and comfortable chairs; here are pen, ink and paper; only don't use the paper with the department heading," and again came the smile.

This was our introduction to one of the noblest of all the noble host that fought the battles of the Union. Such was the genial sincerity of his welcome and the genuineness of his hospitable invitation, that we felt we should not do it justice if we declined to receive it at its full value. Then came to the tired teachers, weary with the day's effort to bring order out of chaos, evenings of quiet and rest, full also of a wonderful interest. The aids of the general were young gentlemen of culture and kind feeling. We all became friends. Gen. Thomas was usually in the room when not busy with official duties. Always courteous and affable, genuinely friendly, he had then, as he always commanded, the regard and affection of his staff and of the rank and file as well, and it was not long before we shared that feeling. He talked little, but when he did talk he had something to say. He was always interested in what we young fellows were saying when he was sitting with us around the fire, but usually he sat in a distant corner of the big living room, reading or chatting with one of his aids, or with a fellow officer whose rooms were nearby, who was a most agreeable companion.

The house that Gen. Thomas had taken for his headquarters was on High Street, then the residence street of the fashionable and wealthy citizens of Nashville. The rooms were spacious and well suited to the commander's needs. After the war the house was, I believe, returned to the owner, and later became the home of the Hermitage

Club. On certain evenings of the week, when the band played martial and patriotic tunes from 8 to 9 o'clock, most of the houses on the street, still occupied by the owners, who were strong sympathizers with the "Lost Cause," were closed and darkened to show disapproval of the kind of music the band played, but we noticed that on those warm fall evenings the darkened yards and porches were not without many listeners, for the band was a good one.

A MEDAL PRESENTED TO GEN. THOMAS.

In November, 1865, the State Legislature voted a gold medal to Gen. Thomas in commemoration of the battle of Nashville in 1864, the result of which was a great victory for the Union, one which had much to do with hastening the end of the war. For his conduct of this battle Gen. Thomas received the appointment of major-general in the United States Army, accompanied by the assurance of the secretary of war that "no commander had more justly earned promotion by devotion, distinction and valuable services to his country." On the 15th of December the second anniversary of the battle in 1866, the medal was presented in the general by Governor Brownlow, in the presence of the assembled legislature and as many friends as the hall of the House of Representatives would hold. Gen. Thomas was expected to reply to the governor's address. He was a very modest man, and disliking above all things the duty of making a speech.

The night before the presentation he said, "I really believe I would rather fight over again the battle of Nashville than to make that speech. Any one of you fellows can do it better than I can." The eventful day came. We were fortunate enough by the kindness of the general and his staff to have excellent seats close to the speakers 'stand. Governor Brownlow, his head and hand shaking with the palsy which had for many months afflicted him, in a characteristic address such as no one else could have made, presented to Gen. Thomas, who rose and stood by his side, a handsome gold medal. A suitable inscription and the capitol at Nashville was on one side and on the other, in bas-relief, a portrait of Thomas. The general seemed greatly affected and much embarrassed, but after a long pause he began his response in a voice low and trembling at first, but in a moment firm and strong, and told in a quiet and modest way the story of the battle of Nashville. No trained orator could have produced such an impression upon that large audience as was made by this simple narrative by the leader to victory in this great struggle. The scene was one never to be forgotten by anyone who was present.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN NASHVILLE.

In the spring of the year 1869 Andrew Johnson, who had just finished his term as President of the United States, came home to Tennessee, and for some months resided in Nashville. Soon after his return, the very day, indeed, he delivered from a platform erected in the Courthouse square, his defense of his administration, in the presence of thousands of men. No seats were provided; everyone had to stand. We young fellows from New England were full of curiosity to see and hear this remarkable man, of whom we had heard so much. None of us had ever seen him, but we had read of his humble birth, his ignoranc of letters, in the literal sense of the word, until he was taught them when he was of age, of his bitter political fights with the Whig leader, Parson Brownlow, and much, of course, of his presidential career. So we were eager to look upon and hear the man

who had achieved so much, and had been charged by his enemies with pretty much all the crimes in the calendar.

It was a simple, plain, well-constructed apologia, as the philosophers might call it, for his public career, and especially for his administration at Washington. There was a sort of sincerity about it, which, for the time at least, won everybody. Perhaps the impression made upon us young men was the greater because of our preconceived idea of the man. I have never read this speech; perhaps it would now seem to me dull and tiresome; but then, in the hearing it was, as has been said. I know that Johnson, the man, was to us a very different person from the Johnson about whom we had read and whom we expected to see. This impression to some of us has been a lasting one, and I was glad to see the other day that Dr. James Schouler, the well-known historian, is about to add a seventh, probably a final, volume to his "History of the United States," in which he is to discuss the administration of Andrew Johnson, and hopes to throw new light upon many things from certain materials now in his hands.

DEATH OF HON. JOHN BELL.

We saw Johnson again in September, 1869. On the tenth of that month died John Bell, a man for more than forty years prominent in Tennessee political affairs, a member of Congress from 1827 to 1841, speaker of the House from 1835 to 1837, secretary of war under William Henry Harrison, and a senator from 1847 to 1850. He was better known nationally as the head of the presidential ticket in 1860 of the party called the "Union party," with Edward Everett, of Massachusetts as his running mate. He had always been an ardent Whig and was a bitter enemy of his Democratic rival, Johnson. In those days oftener than now political hatred became intensely personal, and in a man of Johnson's temper this feeling was always intense. The body of Mr. Bell lay in state in the chamber of the House of Representatives in the State House in Nashville. Sunday afternoon we young fellows made a part of a throng that slowly passed in line by the casket and looked for a moment upon the face of the dead statesman, of whom we had heard much a few years before.

It chanced that Andrew Johnson immediately preceded me in the slowly moving line. I watched him with keen interest as he stood before the body of one of his bitterest enemies, and a certain tenseness of feeling seemed to pervade the quiet, halting crowd. Mr. Johnson stood still for a whole minute with his eyes fastened on the face of Mr. Bell, but he made no sign, and his face was during that moment as expressionless as the face of the dead. Then with a sigh he passed on. We went away as if we had a glimpse of a solemn tragedy.

CANDIDACY OF ANDREW JOHNSON FOR SENATOR

In October, 1869, Johnson made his first fight for election as a senator from Tennessee. For two or three weeks before the election he kept open house at the Maxwell House, then the leading hotel of Nashville, and used all his personal influence to secure the prize. He was most bitterly assailed by his opponents, attacked, as I find in some notes made at the time, "for oppressing the "Rebs," for grinding the Union men, for deserting the Democrats, for leaving the Radicals, for hanging Mrs. Surratt, for not hanging a few thousand rebels, for being an aristocrat, for being a tailor, and hence the ninth part of a man, for favoring the negroes, for not doing more for them, for vetoing bills, for not vetoing more, for being drunk, for

not being willing to drink on certain occasions, for appointing this man to office and for not pressing the claims of that man, for occupying the "bridal chamber" at the new hotel, for not hobnobbing with the slums among the people while in the city, for being alive physically, and not wanting to die politically, and for doing, not doing and undoing a thousand and one things which have turned up during his mortal life." He was defeated this time after four days of excited balloting.

AN INCIDENT.

An interesting incident occurred on the day when Johnson delivered his apologia in September, 1869, worth noting as an illustration of the freaks of fortune in war times. Mr. Edward Earle, of Worcester, Mass., a member of the Society of Friends, and warm friend of Lincoln and Grant, had had much to do with the care of the sick and wounded soldiers on both sides during the war. He happened to be in Nashville on the day of Mr. Johnson's speech. He was an old friend and I called on him at the City Hotel soon after his arrival. I knew the proprietor of the hotel and called him by name. Mr. Earle at once said to him, "Is this Col. Blood, formerly a resident of the State of Georgia?" "Yes, sir," was the reply. "Did you have a son in the Confederate Army?" "Yes, sir," said the old gray-haired man in a voice choking with emotion, "but he was reported wounded and missing, and I doubt not that he is dead. He was a fine boy." Mr. Earle went on to tell that, years before, in one of the Federal hospitals he found a young wounded lieutenant from Georgia whose death was near. He gave to Mr. Earle the address of his father and his gold watch, a fathers' gift, and asked that it might some day, if possible, be given to Col. Blood with his dying message of love. The good Quaker had carried the watch in all his journeys in the South on many an errand of mercy. He had gone to the former residence of this Southern family in Georgia, but no one knew anything of the father or any member of his family. The report was that all were dead. The watch and the message of love were at once given to the old father and mother, who received them with abundant thanks and copious tears of joy and sorrow. One can fancy, too, the satisfaction of the good and faithful man who now saw the fulfillment of the promise he had made to the dying boy.

MARSHALL S. SNOW.

HISTORICAL NOTES AND NEWS

"The Story of a poet: Madison Cawein" issued as publication No. 30 of the Filson Club, Louisville, Ky., by Otto A. Rothert, secretary of the Filson Club.

A handsome and very interesting book, the purpose of which is to tell the life-story of Madison Cawein, the poet, who was born in Louisville and lived all his life in that city or its vicinity, dying there in December, 1914. Cawein gained a high place among modern nature poets. Kentuckians appreciated and loved him, as is distinctly shown in the many tributes published in this volume. The book, in fact, is an exceptionally fine and creditable manifestation of appreciation of one of its worthy sons, on the part of a community and State, and is of special local historical interest. The material is presented as a complete biography and in the form of a source book. The greater portion of the story, as stated in the preface, is history as printed by the contemporary press and as revealed through Cawein's letters as well as the reminiscences and recollections of his friends. The first 68 pages are devoted to a "picturography" of Madison Cawein, which is an unusual and delightful feature. The Tennessee Historical Society acknowledges receipt of the book with thanks. Only 300 copies were printed beyond the requirements of the Filson Club's membership.

R. N.

Our Rifles 1800-1920. By Charles Winthrop Sawyer, pub. by The Cornhill Company, Boston, Mass. Price \$4.50.

A phase of military history having a unique interest in itself is that of firearms. The above publishers have issued a series of volumes bearing on this title, which they designate: "*The Firearms in American History Series*". Of this series three volumes have already been issued, the one here noted being Volume III.

In a handsome volume of over four hundred pages with many full-page illustrations, the story of "*Our Rifles From 1800-1920*" is well told. The author himself a consulting engineer of firearms and ammunition is amply prepared to set forth the technical as well as the historical descriptions necessary to a complete recital of the field sought to be covered.

The Kansas Historical Society has issued the *Twenty-second Biennial Report of the Board of Directors*, July 1, 1919-June 30, 1920 in its usual neat form making a handsome little volume of 79 pages. William E. Connelly, Secretary.

Welfare Campaigns in Iowa by Marcus L. Hansen is published by the Iowa Historical Society in the series of *Chronicles of the World War* edited by Benjamin F. Shambaugh. It is devoted to an account of the campaigns in Iowa for the raising of funds to support welfare work. This study of the campaigns for the funds which financed the welfare work is limited to the seven organizations which were officially recognized as national welfare organizations.

It is thought that a much desired want has been supplied in the history of Michigan for the period of 1837-1845 by the issuing of Mr. Lawton T. Hemans' *Life and Times of Stevens Thomson Mason, the Boy Governor*. Mrs. Hemans the wife of the deceased author, contributes an interesting preface giving a number of personal touches that greatly adds to the inner side of the story. The large handsome volume of 528 pages is issued by the Michigan Historical Commission, Lansing, Michigan.

Annual Report of the American Historical Association, in two volumes, together with Supplemental Volume. Smithsonian Institution, 1918.

On account of the prevalence of the enfluenza epidemic, the 1918 meeting of the American Historical Association scheduled for Cleveland, Ohio, failed in its meeting, and instead a meeting of the Executive Council was held in New York City, January, 1919. *Volume I* contains the Proceedings of the Council as the Proceedings of the Association for 1918, the opening address that was to have been delivered before the meeting of the Association by President William Roscoe Thayer, a group of papers and documents relating to American agriculture, history, etc.

One of the most interesting of this group of papers is that prepared by Lyman Carrier entitled: "Dr. John Mitchell, Naturalist, Cartographer and Historian." Dr. Mitchell who is widely known as the author of a most important map of North America in the colonial era (1755) is here credited with the authorship of several very important writings that up to this time have been classed as of unknown authorship.

Volume II consists of the Fourteenth Report of the Manuscript Commission, being the Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, eighth President of the United States,—an interesting review of which appeared in the last number of this magazine by Mr. W. E. Beard. It should have been noted that the final part of *Volume I* contains a directory of the American Historical Association, which is at the same time to all intents and purposes a directory of the historical profession in America.

The *Supplemental Volume* contains a biography of writers on American History during the year 1918, compiled by Miss Grace Gardner Griffin.

ITEMS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE TENNESSEE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JANUARY MEETING, 1921

Tennessee Historical Society met at its rooms in the Watkin's Building, January 11th, 1921, 8 p. m.

In the absence of the President Jno. H. DeWitt, Mr. Hallum W. Goodloe was called to the chair. Minutes of the last meeting were read and approved.

The following names were proposed for membership, and on motion the rules were suspended and same elected:

Miss Laura M. Luttrell, Lawson-McGhee Library, Knoxville.

Hon. J. H. Dortch, Washington, D. C.

Miss Clara Epperson, Cookeville, Tennessee.

Miss Imogen T. Howard, Greenville, Tennessee.

The following gifts to the society were presented which were appreciatiengly received and proper acknowledgment ordered to the doners: viz:

From Mr. Roulstone, McKenzie, Tennessee, a small writing table, originally the property of his great-grand-father's, George Roulstone of Knoxville, Tenn. It being used as the writing desk of Geo. Roulstone, the editor and publisher of the first newspaper in Tennessee, viz: the "Knoxville Gazette." As the Society is the possessor of the only file of this valuable paper, it was doubly appreciative of this gift.

From Hon. J. H. Dortch,* Washington, D. C. (formerly of Somerville, Tenn.) a printed pamphlet: "By-laws and History of Somerville Lodge of Masons," published by the doner at Somerville, Tenn., 1891.

From, the London and Middlesex Historical Society, through the Librarian, Fred Landon, London, Canada, ten numbers of the "Transactions" of the society.

From the publishers of "Americana" the new American cyclopedia, a set of same. Being in fulfillment of contract made with the late George C. Porter for the article on "Tennessee" colloborated by Col. Porter from articles furnished by certain members of this Society.

From Mr. D. C. Cothorn, Pleasantville, Tennessee, a splendid specimen of fossil animal life.

From the author—Annie Noble Sims, of Savannah, Ga—a volume, "Francis Morgan, And Early Virginia Burgess," privately printed for the author.

Application was received from the Librarian of the University of Pennsylvania asking gift from this society of certain numbers of the *American Historical Magazine*, A. V. Goodpasture, Editor, and for a file of the volumes of the *Tennessee Historical Magazine*. The Cor. Sec. was ordered to make this gift or exchange for like matter, special interest in same being created inasmuch as the former editor of our Tennessee Historical Magazine, Dr. Sioussat, now holds the Chair of History in this university.

A discussion was had concerning the propriety of making certain changes in the by-laws with reference to membership in the Society, same was referred to next meeting of the Society.

Adjourned.

Hallum W. Goodloe, President pro. tem.
J. Tyree Fain, Secretary.



THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN

Author(s): W. W. Gist

Source: *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, JANUARY, 1921, Vol. 6, No. 4 (JANUARY, 1921), pp. 213-265

Published by: Tennessee Historical Society

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.com/stable/44000311>

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TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF LIBRARY, ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

Author(s): E. B. Wilson, Newton H. White, Will K. Abernathy, J. I. Cox, John T. Cunningham Jr., E. G. Tollett, T. E. Gordon, James Armitage, W. T. Galloway, J. M. Graham, F. M. McRae, Albert E. Hill, Wm. P. Cooper, Seth M. Walker, Andrew L. Todd and A. P. Foster

Source: Tennessee Historical Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 4 (JANUARY, 1921), pp. 266-278

Published by: Tennessee Historical Society

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A YANKEE SCHOOL MASTER'S REMINISCENCES OF TENNESSEE

Author(s): Marshall S. Snow

Source: Tennessee Historical Magazine, JANUARY, 1921, Vol. 6, No. 4 (JANUARY, 1921), pp. 279-283

Published by: Tennessee Historical Society

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HISTORICAL NOTES AND NEWS

Author(s): R. N.

Source: *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (JANUARY, 1921), pp. 284-285

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ITEMS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE TENNESSEE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JANUARY MEETING, 1921

Author(s): Hallum W. Goodloe and J. Tyree Fain

Source: Tennessee Historical Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 4 (JANUARY, 1921), p. 286

Published by: Tennessee Historical Society


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Snow, Marshall S. "A Yankee School Master's Reminiscences of Tennessee." *Tennessee Historical Magazine* 6, no. 4 (1921): 279-83. Accessed July 24, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44000313>. Harris, J.P. "Reviewed Work: 1917: War, Peace, And Revolution by David Stevenson." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 96, no. 387 (2018): 279-83. Accessed July 23, 2021.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26876152>

R. N. "Historical Notes and News." *Tennessee Historical Magazine* 6, no. 4 (1921): 284-85. Accessed July 24, 2021.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/44000314>

Goodloe, Hallum W., and J. Tyree Fain. "Items From the Minutes of the Tennessee Historical Society January Meeting, 1921." *Tennessee Historical Magazine* 6, no. 4 (1921): 286. Accessed July 24, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44000315>

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